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Dissertation Abstract

The Ambivalence of Participation in Transitional Justice: The Promises and Failures of
Peace in Colombia

The dissertation inquires into participation in transitional justice in Colombia. Through an
examination of Peace Councils and Mesas de Participación, it offers readers concrete
examples of such mechanisms for participation, discussing their legal and bureaucratic
structures. Weaving in ethnographic research, the author allows the participants
themselves, victimized-survivors of the armed conflict and community leaders, to discuss
the limits and possibilities of their work. Placing these voices and archival research in
historic and theoretical context, the dissertation leaves readers with questions regarding
the ambivalence of state, institutional, and participant’s stances towards participation in
transitional justice.
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Chapter One: The Research Problem
Statement of the Problem
This study inquires into victims’ participation in transitional justice in Colombia
at a crucial time for the construction of peace.1 While the interviews were conducted in
the first few months of 2018, the work as a whole draws on over a decades-long
immersion into human rights research in Colombia. It explores the space between the
legal frameworks for mechanisms of participation and the experiences of representatives
of victims’ associations and community research groups organizing and participating in
them. Doing so, it poses important questions for the conception and formulation of
participation for scholars in Transitional justice Studies, advocates of Transitional justice
programs, and to the field of human rights more broadly.
While interviews were conducted in the first few months of 2018, the work as a
whole draws on over a decades-long immersion into human rights research in Colombia.
This work, while examining the current conditions under which participation in
transitional justice occurs and how it contours the experiences of participants,
understands these conditions as not simply a product of the political present. Colombia
has been under various states of conflict since its foundation. The current armed conflict,
ongoing for over a half a century, has produced a robust legacy of civil society
In using the term “victim” here, I am addressing its official usage by state institutions, upon which I
elaborate later. In other instances not referring directly to the state category and its adoption by civil
society, and following the example of post-colonial feminist scholarship, I use victimized-survivor to
address those living who have been victimized by the armed conflict (Chatterji et al, 2016, p. 265). This
usage is in line with critiques of victimization and victimhood, that refuse a marginalization of the agency
of victimized-survivors. (Chatterji et al, 2016; Mohanty, 1984). On the contrary, Colombian victimizedsurvivors have and continue to display inordinate amounts of courage and capacity in leading efforts
towards truth, justice, and reparation.
1
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mobilization against violence, forcing the development of dense and progressive
jurisprudence related to human rights, participation, and peace. This both includes and
stems from histories of negotiated agreements between the state and armed groups.
Despite these histories of resistance and state response, the armed conflict in Colombia
continues. This context is important as we examine what has brought us to this moment
of transitional justice in Colombia, helping us to resist facile explanations for its current
failings and possibilities.
The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is a product of
violence. The guerrilla army emerged from the ashes of La Violencia, a decade long civil
war that shed the blood of hundreds of thousands of Colombians, while displacing
another million, and reinforcing the lesson that many across Colombia had learned from a
long history of civil wars: political violence, while illegitimate, is a brutally effective
tool of political force and control.2 In the seventy years since La Violencia, political
violence has become a mainstay of life in Colombia as insurgency and counterinsurgency, and its consequent paramilitarization have combined with the United States’
War on Drugs to spread violence to every region of Colombia (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2016). Hundreds of thousands of people have lost their lives, while
millions have been forced from their homes (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica,
2017). Gendered and sexualized violence, both a direct and indirect effect of the war, are

Depending on how they are counted, Colombia endured between four and nine civil wars between its
founding in 1819 and La Violencia in 1948. In particular, the four civil wars between 1876 and 1899
contoured a political struggle between the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties that saw the
exercise of violence as principal to Colombian politics (Palacios, 2006). Not counted in these civil wars
were a great number of regional armed insurgencies and conflicts that did not become national in scale.
2
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widespread (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2017). Corruption, fueled by
military aid and international capital, has become endemic to government at all levels (El
Tiempo, 2017).
Yet civil society in Colombia has remained vibrant. Victimized-survivors of the
armed conflict have organized, working with national and international organizations to
document abuses, advocate for justice and restitution, and call for an end to the war.
Despite a history of failed or partial peace agreements between the various guerrilla
groups, and a paramilitary demobilization effort under the presidency of Alvaro Uribe
(2002-2010) that saw few crimes prosecuted, even fewer punished, and led to a
reconstitution of paramilitary forces across Colombia, civil society groups and human
rights organizations have been insistent on a negotiated end to the internal armed conflict
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2012; Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica,
2014).
In April of 2011, the FARC initiated peace talks with the then-recently elected
President Juan Manuel Santos, having been denied such talks by Uribe’s previous
government. Following years of negotiation in Havana, Cuba, with international support
and civil society participation, the Final Agreement To End the Armed Conflict and Build
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A Stable and Lasting Peace was signed on November 24th, 2016.3 The Peace Accord is
organized under six chapters with related provisions:
1. Comprehensive Rural Reform,
2. Political Participation,
3. Agreement on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities
and Laying down of Arms,
4. Solution to the Illicit Drugs Problem,
5. Victims, and Implementation and
6. Verification Mechanisms.
In effect, the Peace Accord presents a framework for a comprehensive system of
transitional justice: mechanisms for truth, accountability, restitution, and non-repetition
seeking a just transition away from armed conflict and towards stable democratic
governance. Further, it explicitly seeks to guarantee the rights of victims, ethnic
communities, and other vulnerable groups such as women, children, and Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgendered (LGBT) persons. It provides for a system of limited amnesty for
political crimes that requires acts of restitution to affected individuals and communities
while mandating sentences for grave violations of human rights. It also creates temporary
and non-voting congressional seats for a non-violent FARC political party and opens the
Official talks began in Havana, Cuba, gathering steam as both parties signed a “General Agreement for
the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace” that gave structure to
the negotiations. In the proceeding years, the FARC issued several temporary unilateral cease-fires before
an agreement to an indefinite bilateral ceasefire with a commitment to total disarmament by the FARC
was signed in June of 2016. The final agreement was announced in August of that year, and while a
popular referendum to accept the deal was rejected by a narrow margin in October, The FARC and the
Colombian Government modified the agreement and signed the Final Peace Accord at a formal ceremony
on November 24th 2016, followed by congressional ratification on December 1st (Segura & Mechoulan,
2017).
3
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door for legitimate participation in government. Lastly, it commits to a sweeping program
of agrarian reform as well as a system of verification for the implementation of the
accord, with international oversight.
The international community responded with commendation. The Nobel Prize
for Peace was awarded to then president, Juan Manuel Santos in 2016, and foreign states
committed hundreds of millions of dollars towards the implementation of the accord. Yet,
some four years on, the peace process continues to be limited in its implementation of
transitional justice.4 The Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre
Dame, which has been charged with monitoring and verifying the implementation of the
Accord, has produced yearly reports that show the limited success. While demobilization
of the FARC was accomplished at a large scale with relatively uncommon speed and
comprehensiveness, processes of truth, justice and reparation, those that deal with
addressing both the conditions for and effects of the armed conflict, remain partial or
uninitiated. Most troubling has been an increase in violence in areas formally occupied by
the FARC as criminal organizations, often reconstituted paramilitary forces, fill the power
vacuum. Human rights defenders and social leaders have been targeted by such groups
leading to a dramatic increase in selective assassinations (Guevara & Sánchez, 2017).
This incomplete and violent context for the implementation of the Peace Accord has been
exacerbated by a change in government which occurred in 2018 with the election of
President Iván Duque of the Democratic Centre Party, just months after the completion of
While it is salient to mention here that Iván Duque Márquez from the Centro Democratico party was
elected in August of 2018 on a platform resistant to the full implementation of the Peace Accords, it
should be remembered that Colombia has a long history of failing to fully implement laws and
agreements towards the fulfillment of human rights.
4
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my interviews in Colombia.5 Duque ran on a platform explicitly looking for the
dismantling of the Peace Accord as it was signed, seeking the removal of key provisions
for accountability, truth, and rural reform. In the time since his election, his presidency
has faced a collapse of credibility, often seen as duplicitous in its policy, if not outright
corrupt. Acknowledging this tension between professed support for peace processes, the
failure to enact meaningful implementation of the Peace Accord, and inability or
unwillingness to protect social leaders and participants in transitional justice, is key to
understanding the ambivalent posture of the Colombian state in regards to human rights
and addressing the root causes of the conflict. This ambivalence, is not solely the
responsibility of any singular political figure or party, and extends backwards in time
across recent decades.

This is a crucial moment in the history of the armed conflict in Colombia. Past
agreements have failed or been limited in effect, leading to the reconstitution of armed
groups and the escalation of violence (Rúa Delgado, 2015). Transitional justice programs,
in other places and at other times, have collapsed or been unable to accomplish a longlasting reduction of political and social violence. For many victimized-survivors of the
internal armed conflict, the promise of transitional justice is the result of decades of

The complexity of recent Colombian political history points to the close connections of its recent
presidents. Juan Manuel Santos was the Minister of Defense under Álvaro Uribe. While his presidency
was initially supported by his predecessor, Uribe began to openly denounce Santos’s policies, particularly
in regards to his support of a negotiated peace with the FARC. This conflict led to the establishment of the
Democratic Centre by Uribe, an ultra conservative political party established in opposition to the
traditional Conservative party, under which both Santos and Uribe served. Duque, a member of the
Democratic Centre, is seen as having his presidency both bolstered and overshadowed by the interests of
Uribe.
5
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organizing and advocacy in the face of ongoing threats and violence. Progress towards
transitional justice that sees Colombia meeting its international human rights
responsibilities is key to the government’s economic and political future. However, the
problem of the implementation of the Peace Accord and the way it affects the lives of
those most proximate to human rights violations, its victimized-survivors, remains central
to an understanding of Colombia’s recent history with important implications for
transitional justice programs across the world.
Critiques of transitional justice efforts in Colombia and elsewhere have addressed
a wide variety of concerns including their often “top-down” nature, the focus on state
processes, and the exclusion of marginalized segments of the population, including
victimized-survivors themselves, in the design and implementation of its mechanisms
(Cuéllar, 2017; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008). Efforts to localize transitional justice by
ensuring the meaningful participation of all stakeholders including victimized-survivors
of the armed conflict and of human rights violations have been proposed by scholars and
advocates as a way to address these issues and ensure an inclusive and sustainable peace
process that addresses the root causes of the conflict while repairing the damage done to
society by decades of civil war (Shaw, Warf, & Hazan, 2010).
Participation is increasingly becoming a key term in transitional justice
studies, and studies of its impact and long-term effect are starting to circulate
(Hilton, 2011). This study, by engaging in participatory research with a local
advocacy and research organization, and conducting in-depth interviews with
representatives of victims’ organizations participating in transitional justice
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mechanisms, as well as with other human rights advocates, seeks to contribute to
this growing literature. Through this study of local knowledge, I examined a few
key structures employed by the state in meeting, or failing to meet, its
constitutional and international responsibilities to provide spaces for meaningful
and effective participation of victims. Combining archival research that includes
local and international human rights reporting, critical scholarship, participant
observation, and interviews, this study provides advocates, policy officials, and
human rights scholars with a critical and grounded perspective on participation in
transitional justice. Critical examinations of the current situation in Colombia are
markedly valuable given the importance of the Peace Accord. Human Rights
advocates, researchers, and policy officials, in particular, are interested in the
approach taken by the Peace Accord, many already stating that it will serve as a
model for future transitional justice programs, particularly in contexts of ongoing
armed conflict (Saffron & Uprimny, 2007; van Nievelt, 2016).
In summary, this work is organized around four objectives:
1. Legal and Bureaucratic Structures of Participation: this study describes
the legal foundation for participation in transitional justice and other
peace processes in Colombia, referring to its Constitution, and a
complex set of laws that establish mechanisms for participation.
2. Participatory Research: this study offers meaningful contributions to El
Centro de Estudios Politicos (CEPO), a local organizing and research
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collective, while gaining an understanding of their role in supporting the
creation of local participatory bodies.
3. Participation and Victimized-Survivors: this study offers an
understanding of the experiences and perspectives of participants in
transitional justice mechanisms.
4. Participation in Transitional justice Studies: this study offers
considerations for an understanding of the limits and possibilities of
participation in addressing key questions in Transitional justice Studies.
My research questions, detailed above and below, dig into these objectives. The
questions break apart the relationship between transitional justice and
Participation, organizing an inquiry into the structure of legal frameworks, the
politics of victims’ participation, and their combined effect on the actuality of the
implementation of Accord.
Background and Need for the Study
The armed conflict in Colombia has no single agreed upon origin. Various events,
dates, and figures emerge throughout historical accounts to give record and ground to
various phenomena. Did the armed conflict that continues today begin with or after La
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Violencia?6 Were the origins of modern paramilitarism Los Pajaros?7 Or rather a result of
Decree 3398 of 1965 which made the permanent defense of the nation-state an obligation
for all citizens, legalizing the formation of right-wing militias? Or perhaps a result of a
clandestine alliance between Colombian and U.S. intelligence forces with right-wing
militias and rival narco-trafficking cartels to assassinate Colombia’s most known cartel
leader, Pablo Escobar, known as MAS (Death to Kidnappers, in its Spanish acronym)? I
am certainly not in a position to enter these historiographic disputes, but would rather
point to enduring conditions of economic inequality; racial, regional, and gendered
dispossession; and political violence to give a broad context to understand the ongoing
conflict.
La Violencia
The 1940s witnessed social movements composed of liberals, socialists, and
communists, both rural agricultural workers and a consolidating industrial labor force,
responding to increasing inequality and economic depression through mass mobilization,
land occupation, and regional strikes (Molano, 2015). Throughout the country, local
police forces and private militias, under the orders of conservative politicians and capital
interests, retaliated violently in a series of assassinations and massacres (Molano, 2015).
These acts combined in a campaign of political cleansing that sought to determine the
outcome of local elections. Those persecuted - namely, liberals, communists, socialists

Indeed, President Uribe, during his long tenure as president refused to recognize the existence of an
internal armed conflict. Insisting instead that it was simply a matter of domestic terrorism requiring an
internal police response ungoverned by the Geneva Conventions.
6

“The Birds”, were bands of right-wing mercenaries used to carry out assassinations and massacres on
behalf of Conservative forces during La Violencia.
7

11
and other dissidents of the Conservative Party—organized themselves into armed groups
for the protection of their communities. These groups eventually evolved into modern
guerrilla forces, urban and rural militias seeking to use violence for self-protection and
towards political change (Molano, 2015)8. This context of escalating violence, historians
tell, was a tinderbox awaiting a spark that came in the form of the assassination of Liberal
presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán during a political rally in Bogotá on April 9,
1948. This event, known as El Bogatazo, is often described as the start of La Violencia.
Blood flowed freely in the following decade as war spread from region to region,
resulting in over 300,000 deaths (Palacios, 2006). Yet, such an accounting neglects the
psychosocial dimensions of a war whose dead were, in their overwhelming majority, noncombatants. Victims of violence were more often targets of revenge or personal gain than
military strategy, resulting in the deaths of entire families and villages. Rape was
common, and women were over one-fifth of those killed (Palacios, 2006, p.136).
The militias born to this landscape of violence would become the guerrillas of
today’s conflict. Escaping burned villages, the victimized-survivors of La Violencia’s
atrocities gathered in relatively inaccessible mountains and jungles, forming 33 armed
commands across Colombia (Molano, 2015). It wasn’t until 1965, in the aftermath of a
failed agrarian reform that promised to address displacement, unequal distribution of
land, and poverty, that a number of these groups gathered to coordinate efforts, forming
This history of the evolution of guerrilla groups, which preceded that of paramilitary groups, differs in a
myriad of ways. Firstly, paramilitary groups were not self-organized defense groups of displaced
community members, instead they were recruited forces brought together and paid by large land owners
and local elites. As such, their goals have been centered around the protection (and expansion) of private
property and the maintenance of the political status quo. Additionally, paramilitary groups have generally
approached the use of violence in more generalized ways, seeking to produce generalized terror through
its undiscriminating and spectacular use.
8
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the FARC. Until its recent demobilization, The FARC was the longest running guerrilla
insurgency in the world, fighting the most protracted civil war in the history of the
Americas. In the nearly sixty years that have followed, the war has expanded to touch
every region of Colombia.9
Over the decades the armed conflict grew in complexity, as armed actors with
contradicting ideological and strategic goals joined in the conflict: other communist
inspired guerrillas including the Ejercito de Liberation Nacional (ELN), leftist urban
student-led insurgents such as the Movimiento 19 de abril (M-19), and right-wing
paramilitary groups that found their zenith under the umbrella organization of the
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). Whether they are understood as directly
participating in the civil war, or simply contributing to the larger panorama of violence,
criminal organizations such as the Medellín and Cali Cartels grew to a size and power
that rivaled both guerrilla and paramilitary organizations. Increasingly, the lines between
these organizations have continued to blur as they have splintered and become more
widespread.

The 2005 census claims a total population of 41,468,384 with over a million Indigenous (3.4%) and over
four million Afro-Colombian (10.6%) persons (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estad stica,
2011). These figures reflect the extension of “ethnic rights” in the Colombian Constitution of 1991 and
Law 70 of 1993, which created strict criteria for the identification of these groups tied to specific notions
of cultural authenticity and difference including language, dress, food, and musical traditions. The
“ethnicization” of difference in Colombia through a multicultural framework has had important and
ambivalent effects in social movements for racial justice (Restrepo, 2004). Anthropologists have a
complex and problematic role as state sanctioned experts endowed with the power to legally certify an
ethnic group, thereby controlling communities’ access to legal rights to land and autonomy (Paschel,
2016).

í
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Scope of the Civil War
The work of writing the history of the conflict, indeed, the work of memory which
communities insist on as they have called for an end to violence, a space of healing and
reparation, and a sense of justice, has been contemporaneous to the conflict itself (Alcalá
& Uribe, 2016). Despite these herculean efforts, we are still often left to describe the
effects of the war in broad strokes, forming a vague outline. “Basta Ya!”, the general
report of the National Center for Historical Memory, an institution founded as a
requirement of the “Peace and Justice” Process, reports that over 220,000 victims lost
their lives to the conflict since 1958 (2016, p. 16).10 Of those, 81.5%, the overwhelming
majority, were civilians.11 To that number we must add military and paramilitary
strategies intended, at least in part, to reduce the apparent number of casualties, including
25,007 victims of enforced disappearance and 2,701 victims of “false positives”(2016, p.
69, p. 185).12
Though the state’s Sole Registry of Victims (RUV) counts more than 4.7 million
forcibly displaced persons as of 2013 in its database, official records on displacement
only began to be recorded in 1997 with the passing of Law 387 which sought to
implement measures to protect against forced displacement and mediate its effects.
The 2005 “Justice and Peace Law” ostensibly demobilized paramilitary forces and provided a
framework for truth, accountability, and reparation. Its effectiveness is contested by human rights groups
who point to the reorganization of paramilitary structures, the growth of right wing armed militias, and
ongoing violence, including the targeting of human rights defenders and social leaders by these groups
(Saffron & Uprimny, 2007).
10

The figures presented in this report draw upon the Register Único de Víctimas (RUV, The Sole Register
of Victims) among other state and civil society sources. The RUV was created by the 2011 Victims Law
(Law 1448) “as a mechanism to guarantee the care and effective reparation of victims”(Centro Nacional
de Memoria Histórica, 2016, p.38).
11

12

See Definition of Terms and Acronyms on page 32.
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Projections based on historical records and available archives lead the authors of the
report to place the figure around 5,700,00, or 15% of the Colombian population (2016,
p.40).13 Other widespread and grave violations of human rights include acts of gendered
and sexualized violence, torture, forced recruitment including of minors as child soldiers,
arbitrary detention, abduction, as well restrictions on civil liberties including the vitiation
of due process, the restriction of free movement, and limitations on the right to participate
freely in political processes.14 At times, and in particular locations, these crimes have
been routinized, contouring life and making the negotiation of violence a quotidian act of
survival.
Vulnerable groups have borne a greater share of this burden. As the war
expanded, it did so into so-called ethnic communities, a political and legal term which
includes Indigenous communities/reservations and Afro-Colombian populations.15 This
expansion resulted in a disproportionate effect on these communities, as racism and
neglect allowed for violence to be under-reported and under-addressed by state
institutions and national media. Given the rural and often precarious situation these
communities endured before and during the war, the loss of life and mass displacement

The Global Report on Internal Displacement, a joint report by the Norwegian Refugee Council and
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre published in 2017, places the figure at 7.2 million. This makes
Colombia the nation with the highest number of Internally Displaced Persons in the world, though they
warn that this may be an overestimation. The UNHRC, in its 2016 Global Report, affirms that Colombia
has the largest number of Internally Displaced Persons, placing the figure at 7.4 million. It reports that
over two thirds of these persons are indigenous, with the remaining third comprised principally of AfroColombian and campesino farmers (p. 65).
13

I draw a distinction here against enforced disappearance whereby abduction is committed by a nonstate actor without the participation, complicity, or acquiescence of the state. See Definition of Terms and
Acronyms for further elaboration.
14

15

See entry for Ethnic Rights in Definition of Terms and Acronyms on page 30.

15
from their lands have threatened cultural survival. Afro-Colombian and Indigenous
advocacy groups report that paramilitary groups targeted ancestral practices in the course
of the conflict, destroying traditional agricultural lands, denying the right to public
assembly necessary for ceremonies, including those of mourning, and targeting elders and
spiritual leaders for assassination. According to the Organización Nacional Indígena de
Colombia (ONIC), 102 distinct Indigenous communities face extinction with 32 groups
having fewer than 500 members (GHM, 2016).
Of those affected by the armed conflict, women have been particularly and
egregiously affected. As men roughly account for ninety percent of casualties of the
armed conflict, women have been forced to become heads of households, often left as the
sole financial support for their families, while also seeking accountability and reparation
through state and international mechanisms (Sánchez Gómez, 2008). Taking on these
burdens often meant exposing themselves and their remaining family to dangerous
visibility as they endured long exhausting days of travel pursuing legal and administrative
procedures that increased their vulnerability to violent repression and abuse by armed
groups and state officials (GHM, 2016). Their roles as advocates and social leaders in
their communities have led to their increased targeting for assassination. “Basta Ya!” also
recognizes that gendered and sexualized violence in the context of armed conflict aims at
“punishing and instilling regimes of control… teaches lessons, sows terror and forces
unarmed civilians to comply with certain role and behavioral codes imposed by armed
actors” (GHM, 2016, p. 317). Sexual violence as a weapon of war can be attributed to
members of all armed groups, including the Armed Forces of Colombia, and includes
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sexual slavery, sexual torture, forced abortions, and rape (Centro Nacional de Memoria
Histórica, 2017). While young women and girls were the principal targets of these acts,
sexual violence permeated the war, affecting persons of all genders (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2017). Gendered violence, seeking to regulate gendered and sexual
norms functioned as a “consolidation of a moral order, which coincides with
heteronormativity, in its effort to punish, correct, or expel those persons which live
outside of this norm” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015, p. 431).16 Despite
national changes in recent years that have extended legal protection to LGBT persons in
Colombia; guerrilla, paramilitary, and state forces have all participated in acts of sexual
and heteronormative violence against them. Furthermore, heteronormative violence
perpetrated by non-participants of the armed conflict, local communities and individuals,
was exacerbated by the heightened regulation of the “moral order” with the presence of
armed groups (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2015, p. 432).
Community leaders and human rights groups have worked to document
violations, rebuild community support networks, and seek restitution, often in the face of
direct threats and targeted assassinations. Despite the efforts of local communities and a
series of national initiatives for humanitarian assistance, restitution, and justice, local
leaders assert that state response has, when present, been minimal and inappropriate in
addressing the aftermath of human rights violations. All states, as arbiters of justice
within the nation, have the legal obligation to ensure the rights of its citizens and must be
held to a higher standard than non-state groups. In its war against the FARC, the
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Colombian state has the added responsibility of being directly and indirectly responsible
for the great majority of grave human rights violations. For example, of the 1,982
massacres documented by the Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 58.9% were
perpetrated by paramilitary forces, and 7.9% are attributable to the Armed Forces of
Colombia (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). Similarly, for selective
assassinations, which account for the great majority of casualties in the conflict,
paramilitary groups were positively identified as the perpetrators in 38.4% of cases, the
Armed Forces in 10.01%, and joint paramilitary and Armed Forces operations in an
additional 0.4% of cases (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). This last figure,
while a small percentage, points to the long-standing nexus of paramilitary and state
forces. While paramilitary groups are, under any measure, responsible for the great
majority of deaths, forced displacement, enforced disappearance, and other acts of
brutality including torture, dismemberment, and sexual and gendered violence, they often
committed these acts with the participation, consent, or acquiescence of Colombian
Security Forces and state officials. Indirect participation included offering logistical
support, silencing dissent, and omitting facts in their reporting (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2016).
While the anti-paramilitary decrees of 1989 reversed a legal framework legalizing
and encouraging the growth of paramilitary units, the phenomena reached its pinnacle in
the early 2000s. Since then, there have been waves of accountability in which state
investigators have slowly revealed links between the government, paramilitary
organizations, and their violent acts. The para-politics scandals, as they are known in
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Colombia, continue today, threatening to implicate an ever-greater number of political
figures in paramilitary violence (Alsema, 2012). In 2005, Alvaro Uribe’s government,
facing increasing pressure from international human rights organizations, including the
International Criminal Court, as well as the U.S. Congress, culminated ongoing
negotiations with the AUC with the passage of the so-called Justice and Peace Law, Law
975. This law established minimal institutional mechanisms for victims to claim rights
under a much larger process of paramilitary demobilization and truth tribunals. The law
has been widely criticized for the incomplete and at times fraudulent demobilization of
paramilitary forces. Three years after the implementation of the law, only 24 victims had
successfully received damages (Summers, 2012). A joint report from the United Nations
and Colombia’s Ministry of Justice from 2016 declared that less than 4% of entitled
victims received any reparations (Martínez Sánchez, 2016). As of 2015, paramilitary
soldiers had confessed to over 70,000 crimes; yet only 37 convictions have been
successfully prosecuted under the law (Human Rights Watch, 2015). The focus on the
creation of justice mechanisms under the peace accord has further burdened judicial
systems further slowing prosecutions under the Justice and Peace Law.
Despite the clear limitations of Law 975, it has deeply affected civil society in
Colombia and is frequently cited as the first transitional justice effort in the country
(Rowen, 2016; Saffron & Uprimny 2007; Sandvik & Lemaitre, 2015). By creating the
legal category of Victim of the Armed Conflict, the law was instrumental in providing
legitimization and institutional support for victims’ organizations. Victimized-survivors
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of the conflict have taken on this new legal category as a platform from which to
advocate for justice and restitution.
Yet, in the years leading up to and immediately following Law 975, the conflict
evolved and escalated as armed struggle for control of territory became increasingly tied
to economic interests. Forcibly taken lands were used for drug production and trafficking
and, more recently, for mineral extraction and large-scale agriculture (AI, 2014).
International corporations, financial elite, and government officials have been implicated
in the widespread expropriation of land by armed groups resulting in the dispossession of
over 13.3 million acres - or about 14% of Colombia’s territory (Amnesty International,
2014; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Summers, 2012). In Colombia, economic interest in
the context of armed conflict has resulted in the dramatic concentration of land resulting
in the most unequal distribution in Latin America, where 1.15% of landowners own
52.2% of arable land (Summers, 2012).
The effects of past and ongoing violence determine life for many Colombians as
they work for peaceful and just mechanisms of accountability and reparation. The Peace
Accord contributes to a robust but complicated panorama of past agreements, laws, and
judicial and executive decrees, creating a large, confusing, and unevenly distributed
system of transitional justice. Victimized-survivors of the armed conflict
disproportionately assume responsibility for implementing these systems, often with
serious lack of institutional support and financial resources. This study, in conducting
grounded and participatory research, addresses the complexity of transitional justice in
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Colombia, its uneven implementation, and points to the transformation and persistence of
violence in Colombia for communities most affected by the armed conflict.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of organizers,
advocates, and victims’ representatives in mechanisms for participation in
transitional justice in a conflicted democracy (Aoláin & Campbell, 2005; Chatterji
et al., 2016). My research included in-depth interviews with members of Victims’
Mesas, at the municipal, departmental and national levels, as well as participatory
work with CEPO, El Centro de Estudios Politicos,17 an organizing and research
collective dedicated to expanding democratic participation in Colombia. It
documents local knowledge of these key stakeholders to offer a grounded critique
of participation in transitional justice in Colombia.
Theoretical Framework
In its widest sense, the notion of governmentality, as introduced by Michel
Foucault (2007), describes the techniques of government aimed at managing
population and its resources. In particular, governmentality refers to: The
“ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections,
calculations and tactics” which allow the exercise of power (in its governmental
form) where the target of power is a population and the primary form of
knowledge it employs is political economy with “the apparatus of security as its
essential technical instrument” (Foucault, 2007, p. 108).

17

See Chapter Three for a description of CEPO and their work.
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Analysis of governmentality by Foucault and others has been primarily
focused on neoliberal governments and their biopolitical practices (Brown, 2017;
Cotoi, 2011; Foucault, 2008; Restrepo, 2004).1819 This conception of neoliberal
governmentality posits the maximization of resources and the subjectification of
populations towards the liberalization of economy and the securitization of nation
as the key-organizing principles of government. These are biopolitical regimes in
so far as governments seek to manage populations through their categorization,
divisions that produce manageable units through social discourses that affix their
supposed value or threat to the larger nation-state (Foucault, 2008; Restrepo,
2004). Subjectification describes the process through which individuals and
communities come to internalize (wholly or partially) these biopolitical identities.
While the theorization of governmentality has largely been limited to
stable, so-called advanced democracies, I argue that this theory is helpful in
understanding the experience of Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino
Wendy Brown in a recent work, argues that neoliberalism is not simply an economic model but a form
of rationality that extends the logic of financial markets to all aspects of life, undermining democracy
(2017). In an interview on her work she states, “I treat neoliberalism as a governing rationality through
which everything is “economized” and in a very specific way” (Brown & Shenk, 2017). Unlike
liberalism, neoliberal rationality reduces human value to its commodification and speculation, rendering
formerly political and social spheres to mere economic rationality. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, makes a
similar point when discussing the Colombian Peace Accord, arguing that its success in creating conditions
for a lasting peace are dependent on a commitment to a “Democratic Peace” over a “Neoliberal Peace”
(2017).
18

The question of the biopolitical is a site of contention across the humanities and social sciences. I
understand it as the management of life and death, towards the subjectification of individuals in the
management of populations. Here, various and contradictory techniques of government, including those
grounded in medicine, pedagogy, policing and security, are aimed at both individuals and larger
collectives, seeking to have them internalize particular relations of power to produce certain social
behaviors. Thus techniques which produce exclusion and death are no less biopolitical, in that such acts of
state sanctioned violence seek to communicate to larger communities particular understandings of
national belonging and what is deemed appropriate and acceptable (political) behavior.
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communities as they live within and against imposed identities manufactured by
the state and contend with a political economy seeking their literal and figurative
displacement. Neoliberal economics, elaborated by national and multinational
elites, place the development and exploitation of ‘national’ resources as central to
the economic and political security of the nation-state. Afro-Colombian,
Indigenous, and campesino20 advocates refuse this claim, documenting and
denouncing the ways in which large-scale efforts at resource extraction and
production have resulted in an escalation of political violence, a vitiation of
traditional economies of subsistence, and have thus threatened both economic and
cultural survival. A critical examination of Colombian governmentality not only
provides a context for understanding the armed conflict in Colombia, but also
affords key insight into the possibilities and limits of transitional justice as these
processes seek an expansion of neoliberal economic rationales while attempting to
address widespread human rights violations. Furthermore, it offers an
understanding of the limits and apparent failures of mechanisms of participation
and human rights despite their strong legal foundation and discursive support by
state and international officials. This approach is necessary against a backdrop of
certain threads of human rights scholarship, including that of human rights
education, that in its universalist and legalistic forms, uncritically assumes a

I use campesino, which may roughly translate to peasant, in keeping with its Colombian usage
describing rural land working communities. Campesino is a racially ambiguous term, used, as I do above,
to name those not categorized as, nor perhaps self-identified with, the “ethnicized” terms Afro-Colombian
and Indigenous, but who share a dependence on land for self-subsistence and cultural reproduction. In
Colombia, the terms Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino, are often used to name communities
fighting for territorial rights.
20
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progressive and invariably beneficial outcome to human rights norms, transitional
justice mechanisms, and victims’ participation (Zembylas, 2016).
Between law as norm and the possibilities of communities’ and civil
society’s resistance to state neglect and violence lies a complex and dynamic
relation. The implementation of counter-insurgency policy in Colombia, itself an
extension of emergency rule established during the half-a-century-long civil war,
conflates images of liberal politicians, guerrilla insurgents, Marxist students, and
campesino, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian movements for land and autonomy
(Franco Restrepo 2009). As law categorized citizens as threats or possible threats
to the nation, civil society and local communities were often compelled to
reproduce the exclusion of dangerous others through a refusal to document,
denounce, and seek justice for state violations of political and human rights. This
was effected through fear of legal and extra-legal reprisal, including extra-judicial
execution and enforced disappearance, and the establishment of a dominant/
majority assumption that victims of state (and para-state) violence are at least
partially guilty, if not of specific crimes, then of a subversive political subjectivity
that either outright legitimizes or minimally explains their targeting.
Through international pressure, there has been a shift in Colombian state
discourse acknowledging the systematic violation of human rights over the past
60 years (Tate, 2007). Yet such discourse, produced through varied and
conflicting bureaucratic agencies, often refuses an acknowledgment of state
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violence and complicity in paramilitary violence. In producing the category of
‘new criminal organizations’ (BACRIM, Nuevas Bandas Criminales) for still
intact and functioning paramilitary units classified as demobilized, the state
expunges recent history that establishes the legal and political continuities
between paramilitary organization, funding, arming, and deployment and state
support/initiation of these activities.
Human rights processes and discourse have been, at least partially,
subverted to continue the marginalization of political dissidents, conflating armed
insurgency, criminal (paramilitary and narco-traffic) organizations, and nonviolent dissent, often targeting communities denouncing state violence. The
dominant deployment of human rights law and discourse in Colombia today
reinscribes the image of “other” as threat to security and nation, while providing a
response to regional and international human rights bodies calling for an end to
state violence and the implementation of processes of truth, justice, and reparation
(Franco Restrepo, 2009).21 Not only must a subject produce itself as deserving of
human and political rights in alignment with national interests, but the desire for

I use “other” here in the political and philosophical sense. It is an “other” to the “self” of the normative
structure of governance, the target of policies intended to maximize life and its potential of capitalist
productivity. It is the “other” to the subject of dominant History, the story of civilization that privileges
western reason, history, economy, and subjectivity. In Colombia, the “other” in this case, are those
marginalized racially, sexually, economically, and politically: Indigenous and Afro-Colombian
communities, organized workers and campesinos, dissident students, and others involved in organizing
for human rights and the basic needs of their communities.
21
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such ‘being’ must also be internalized and performed through social acts of
allegiance and acquiescence.22
This discursive apparatus continues to divide Colombian society and
threatens to derail the transitional justice process. It justifies the neglect of
communities deeply affected by the conflict, despite robust jurisprudence
establishing the state’s responsibility to ensure rights to truth, justice, restitution,
and non-repetition. Furthermore, the discursive production of victimizedsurvivors of human rights violations as threats to national security and economic
development, inhibits the implementation of transitional justice and permits the
continued violation of communities and their territories through extra-legal
means. It is in this context that appeals to participation in transitional justice
mechanisms find their real limits, and through which participants face deeply
ambivalent experiences.
Research Questions
Following from my research objectives, the following research questions
guided my inquiry. The first two dig into the broader contexts of Transitional
justice and Participation, offering a way to approach the relationship between both
and the experiences of participants themselves. My last question leads towards the

“Being” here reveals the phenomenological roots to the discourse on the “other” in post-structural and
post-colonial thought from which my arguments come. “Being” in this context, refers to the ways of life
organized in congruence or in resistance to dominant governance and neoliberal rationality.
22
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conclusion of this dissertation, asking the theoretical and practical implications
for Transitional justice Studies, and human rights advocacy more broadly.
1. Structures of Participation: What are key structures for victims’
participation in transitional justice in Colombia? What are their legal
foundation? Who are participants in their bodies and what power do they
have to affect the larger peace process?
2. Participation in Action: What have been the experiences of participants in
these transitional justice mechanisms for participation? What have been
the limits to their effective participation? What has their participation
made possible?
3. Participation in Transitional justice Studies: What do the experiences and
perspectives of Colombian participants in transitional justice mechanisms
offer to scholars and advocates of Transitional justice?
The first two questions are addressed thoroughly by my findings in Chapters 4
and 5. Both of these chapters examine laws and institutions directly related to
legal rights for participation, particularly in transitional justice. Chapter 4
examines the constitutional basis of participation, as well as Law 434, which
established the Peace Councils. These councils are an early form of participation
in peace processes, and are described in this chapter. Chapter 4 continues by
drawing from interviews conducted on a pilot study to address issues with
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participation and the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Chapter
5 picks up where Chapter 4 leaves off, addressing more recent legal and
institutional mechanisms for participation. The chapter weaves in narratives from
participant observation and interviews to ground my findings in the experiences
of victims’ organizers and advocates participating in the mesas, a mechanism for
participation established by law 1448 and built upon by the Peace Accord.
I examine my third research question in my concluding Chapter 6. Here I
link the critiques of participation and the implementation of transitional justice
mechanisms offered by community members and victims’ representatives to
larger questions for Transitional justice Studies, calling for an approach that
recognizes the limits of participation in addressing issues inherent to Transitional
justice and the problematics of neoliberal bio-political governance in securing a
just, equitable, and sustained peace.
Delimitations and Limitations
This study is delimited by a set of specific choices. First, I have chosen to
conduct my research in two overlapping phases. In collaboration with CEPO, I
conducted participatory research, supporting their development of a research
protocol to investigate the implementation of the Peace Accord in the Urabá
region of Antioquia while learning from their work in creating Peace Boards for
local participation. In the second phase I interviewed representatives of Victims’
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Mesas and other civil society advocates, and participated in a series of events
offering participatory spaces for victimized-survivors of the armed conflict.23
My interviews focused on the experiences of participants in transitional
justice mechanisms, many of whom survived human rights violations and have
sought accountability and restitution since the time of the violation. The
interviews at times necessarily involved reference to specific events in their
personal histories, yet interviews did not undertake a recording of in-depth
testimonies of violations. While counseling and legal support was made available
as necessary through allied organizations, such testimonies were beyond the scope
of my study. Furthermore, given participants’ experience with human rights work,
including being well versed in discussing their personal context for the work, no
persons interviewed accepted my offer for referral to psycho-social services.
Instead, my interviews focused on their understanding of and experiences in
transitional justice structures for participation, principally CEPO members’
experiences with organizing Peace Councils across Antioquia, and members of
various Victims’ Mesas. As such, this study did not include a detailed history of
the conflict, though I provide relevant context on the history of the armed conflict.
Furthermore, this study is not comparative and as such will only include passing
mention to other events in recent Colombian and international history.

The two phases of this research were conducted in March and April of 2018. While the first phase was
conducted primarily in March and the second in April, there was a degree of overlap.
23
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Important limitations included financial and time constraints associated
with my travel and stay in Colombia. My professional and personal circumstances
required that I conduct my research over a three-month period. While this is a
relatively brief period in which to address the research questions I proposed, my
experience in Colombia over many trips and years and previously established
relationships to community organizations made this timeline viable.
Lastly, there are important safety concerns that affected my travel. Many
regions in Colombia continue to be under threat by paramilitary successor groups
that have only expanded since the start of the Peace Process between the FARC
and the state. Human rights advocates, including some whom I interviewed, have
received threats that limited their availability and need for limited visibility.
Situating the Self in the Context of the Research
This dissertation represents a network of relationships and experiences
that have defined more than a decade of work in solidarity with those struggling
for peace and justice in Colombia. Though the work of my mentor, Dr. Angana
Chatterji, I was lucky enough to attend the Second World Congress on
Psychosocial Work in Exhumation Processes, Forced Disappearance, Justice, and
Truth at the Universidad Nacional in Bogotá, Colombia in 2010 where she
presented on the findings of “Buried Evidence: Unknown, Unmarked, and Mass
Graves in Indian-administered Kashmir” and participated in the drafting of
international norms for psychosocial support. There, alongside my colleague
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Heidi Rhodes, we met leaders from the Asociación Renacer Siglo XXI, including
Hector Marino Carabalí, its co-founder and legal representative. This
organization, formed in 2001, in the aftermath of a violent decade’s long
paramilitary incursion, was the first of its kind in Northern Cauca.
Through this amazing network, we helped to document cases of enforced
disappearance in Northern Cauca, wrote a report on those cases that was
presented internationally, arranged a solidarity speaking tour in the United States,
and organized a campaign for the protection of human rights advocates threatened
by paramilitary violence, including securing international grants for their
temporary relocation and supporting asylum processes. These experiences,
reflected upon through these crucial relationships, represent my understanding of
the Colombian conflict and the efforts of victimized-survivors to document
violations, expand spaces of democratic participation, and call for and work
towards peace, justice, and reparation.
Despite this immersion, I am and will continue to be an outsider to
Colombia, and in particular to those communities most affected by the armed
conflict. I am aware, as are those whom I collaborated with and interviewed, that
our experiences related to the work we are discussing are separated by very real
differences. I am a visitor to Colombia, someone who has not lived for a
prolonged period under the effects of armed conflict, and who, with a U.S.
American passport in hand, could leave freely at my own discretion. Despite
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meaningful political commitments, my work in Colombia has always been a
choice made through the relative safety of graduate studies and international
travel. This choice is one not available to many of the participants of this study
driven to do their work given the often painful circumstances of their personal
lives. I state these differences clearly, as they are important in understanding the
perspective I offer, and the contexts that have influenced the meaningful
relationships I have built with Colombian human rights defenders and social
leaders. I believe that in this case, this difference has the potential to be
productive allowing for a cross-cultural and international collaboration that seeks
to leverage relative privilege towards accountability in Transitional justice as it is
both understood by scholars and implemented by international advocates.
Definition of Terms and Acronyms
AUC: The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia)
was the largest paramilitary organization in Colombian history. An umbrella organization
that integrated various other paramilitary forces, their bloques (squadrons) came to
occupy large tracts of land across the entire territory of Colombia. A demobilization
process that began in 2006 under the “Justice and Peace Law” 974, led to the dismantling
of the AUC and to testimonies by former paramilitary soldiers in exchange for amnesty
that has given us a partial record of the history of paramilitary human rights violations.
The demobilizations are critically understood to be incomplete as so called “New
Criminal Bands” (BACRIM), also named paramilitary successor groups, continue to
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target human rights advocates and community leaders with assassination and
disappearance.24
ELN: The Ejercito de Liberation Nacional (National Liberation Army) is now, following
the demobilization of the FARC, Colombia’s largest insurgent armed force. A MarxistLeninist insurgency, it began in 1964, and had strong ties to liberation theology. At its
height it had over 5,000 soldiers though their number today is believed to be under 2,000
(Torres, 2017). They are currently in peace talks with the Colombian government in
Ecuador, and a temporary ceasefire has been in place since October 1, 2017.
Enforced Disappearance: According to the Rome Statute, Enforced Disappearance is to
be understood as “the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by
a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of
the law for a prolonged period of time” (UN General Assembly, 1998, p. 5). It has also
been codified as a grave violation of human rights by the United Nations’ International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED) and
the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons. The generally accepted history of the definition and
criminalization of enforced disappearance traces its emergence to movements for
accountability to its widespread use by the authoritarian regimes of Latin America in the
latter part of the twentieth century. There are alternative histories in which scholars point
Following Colombian social leaders and human rights advocates, I will refer to BACRIM simply as
paramilitary forces.
24
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to a longer history including the Third Reich’s use of Enforced Disappearance in its Night
and Fog program and the application of existing international law in prosecuting those
responsible for the program during the Nuremberg Tribunals (Finucane, 2010). Noche y
Niebla, a publication by The Center for Research and Popular Education, is a quarterly
catalogue of human rights violations in Colombia. The title is a nod to the history of the
Nazi program.
Ethnic Rights: The 1991 Constitution of Colombia, itself the product of a constitutional
assembly that was formed as part of a peace accord between the government and several
guerrilla organizations, most prominently the M-19, provided collective rights to
ancestrally held lands for Indigenous groups, the right to prior consultation on
development projects that affect their communities, reservations for political
participation, and the right to limited self-governance (Semper, 2006). Law 70 of 1993
extended these rights to Afro-Colombian communities who met certain requirements
under the law, introducing the concept of a Consejo Communitiario (Community
Council) as the subject of collective Afro-Colombian rights (Paschel, 2016). Due to the
strict system of state authorization of Consejo Communitiarios, many are in a
indeterminate state of approval and are known as Procesos Comunitarios (community
processes), this self-identification functions as both political reminder and metaphor for
the unfinished process of ensuring Afro-Colombian rights.
False Positives: False positives, also known as fake encounter killings, are cases in
which the Armed Forces of Colombia committed extrajudicial executions of civilians and
then documented the killing as (in the language of the state) a positive: a neutralized
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guerrilla insurgent. This tactic included the planting of evidence in the form of guns,
munitions, and went as far as dressing buddies of the deceased in guerrilla fatigues.
Pressure from military command structures contributed to these killings as subaltern units
were pressured to produce increasing numbers of kills (Alston, 2010). Such pressure
took, at times, the form of incentives such as promotions, raises, and extended leaves of
absence. Though investigations of these acts are still underway, by 2011 the state
prosecutor had investigated 1486 cases involving 2701 victims (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2016, pp. 185).
FARC: The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (The Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia) was the largest and longest running insurgency in the Western
Hemisphere. It declared itself in 1964, from what had been 33 separate militias fleeing
persecution by military forces. Its disarmament was declared complete by the United
Nations Mission to Colombia on September 22, 2017 (UNMC, 2017). A small minority
of FARC commands refused to disarm and participate in the Peace Accord, these groups
have reconstituted as FARC dissidents. The persecution of demobilized soldiers, as well
as persisting conditions of poverty and marginalization, have led to the increase in size of
these dissident groups. They have not, as of yet, reconstituted as a national organization.
RUV: The Register Único de Víctimas (The Sole Register of Victims) was created by the
2011 Victims Law (Law 1448) “as a mechanism to guarantee the care and effective
reparation of victims” (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016, p.38). It is the
state’s most comprehensive database of victims of the armed conflict and human rights
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violations. It largely depends on self-reporting of “victims,” subject to verification by the
Register, and is a requirement of application for state restitution and aid.
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Chapter Two: Literature Review
Introduction to Transitional justice
In the growing and disparate field of literature and social, legal, and
political practice known as Transitional justice, no single definition encompasses
the multiplicity of theoretical perspectives or political initiatives. In the widely
accepted toolbox approach, it may be understood as a set of mechanisms: truth
tribunals and commissions, prosecutions, memorialization, amnesty, as well as
projects for reparation and reconciliation (Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan, 2010). More
broadly, it may be defined as an approach to ensuring basic rights in addressing
mass violations of human rights, rights to truth, justice, reparation, and nonrepetition during periods of political transition (Saffon & Uprimny, 2007). Its
discourses are recognized and reproduced through international law, human rights
organizations, state institutions, and civil society groups. Increasingly, there are
academic departments, conferences, and journals dedicated to its study and
development (Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan, 2010). Transitional justice is an
expanding but contested field, still under creation and revision. It is a discursive
site where individual and group actors stake claims to particular visions,
aspirations, and futures, mediated by a particular social and political position and
at times in contradiction to each other’s assertions. Transitional justice is where
abstract legal and political theory meets its instrumentalization in law and
practice, with important effects for those left vulnerable by political violence and
armed conflict.
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Truth and Justice
While questions on the origin of transitional justice may be debated by
scholars interested in fixing a particular identity for its conceptualization and
implementation, its gradual consolidation as theory and practice evolved in
response to critical reflection on relatively recent historical events. In addition to
post-Soviet contexts, the experiences of Latin American states, particularly
Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile, figure significantly in the development of
Transitional justice (Hinton, 2011; Teitel, 2000). These countries, whose leftist,
dissident, Indigenous and Afro-descendent communities endured mass violations
of human rights committed by military governments who had overthrown liberal
democracies in the name of cold war security, followed somewhat similar
trajectories in their transition to a political state of nominal democracy.25
Transitional justice, in its formation in these contexts, evolved from mass
participation in social movements and international pressure. Amnesty was
favored over prosecutions, as jurists and researchers participating in truth
commissions documented the scope of atrocities committed, at times in the face
of violent threats (Teitel, 2000).26 Drastic economic changes, which were pushed
through under emergency rule, were continued or expanded under new dubiously

The United States of America figures prominently in these histories, offering various forms of political,
military, and intelligence support to these coup d’etat.
25

The National Commission on the Disappeared, in Argentina, which documented the forced
disappearance of over 30,000 people under the Argentine dictatorship, is a standout example of such truth
process both in terms of their value and their limits (Hinton, 2011).
26
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elected governments.27 Despite the inability of these new governments to address
the crimes of the previous regimes and, perhaps most consequentially, the effects
of mass violence and physical and economic displacement, a paradigmatic
framework had been established. Transition, the shift from military and/or
authoritarian rule, to liberal democracy, no matter how minimal in its guarantee of
basic rights or in its political representation of the majority of its citizens, became
paramount in these processes (Teitel, 2000). Subsequent critiques sought to
address the issue of impunity in political transitions creating crucial debates
between models that alternatively emphasized ‘truth’ or ‘justice’, dovetailing into
larger human rights debates on ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ (Hinton, 2011). Scholars
critical of legalistic approaches that prioritized accountability under international
law over questions of peace and stability in political transitions emphasized the
use of truth tribunals to symbolically address the past and seek reconciliation
between communities. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
is seen as paradigmatic of this approach (Teitel, 2000).
Legal scholars, emphasizing the normative functions of transitional
processes, sought to ensure that international legal standards were followed,
thereby helping to establish criminal accountability and the strengthening of
human rights law and mechanisms. The late 1990s witnessed a swing towards
accountability with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for
These neoliberal reforms included widespread privatization, austerity in the form of cuts to, or total
annihilation of, social programs including health and education, and the dependence on a debt economy in
the name of economic growth.
27
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR). Both of these Tribunals
initiated mechanisms now associated with transitional justice while prosecuting
large numbers of human rights perpetrators. The International Criminal Court,
established under the Rome Statute of 1998, is also representative of an
accountability approach to addressing mass human rights violations in nations
unable to prosecute powerful perpetrators of human rights through their own
judicial systems.
Time
In Transitional Justice Genealogy, Ruti Teitel, who has been cited as
having coined the term, asserted that, “Transitional justice can be defined as the
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by
legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes”
(Teitel, 2002, p. 25). The substantive emphasis in this definition is on righting
wrongs, specifically in the addressing of past human rights violations.
The goals of Transitional justice are fundamentally tied to the aspiration of
transition, both towards justice for past violations and towards a
cementing of a new political order that will prevent the old order, with its
attendant human rights violations, from returning. (Iverson, 2014, p 85)
Here the question of temporality, implicit in understandings of transition, is made
explicit. Transition evokes a temporality, a movement from the past, into the
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future. The definitions offered by Iverson and Teitel, extend this temporality by
giving it a linear and progressive structure, Transitional justice is thus the
progressive movement in time towards justice and accountability and away from
illegality (Aoláin & Campbel, 2005). Postcolonial critics, and anthropologists in
particular, have cautioned us against implicit teleological bias (Hinton, 2011).
The End of History, a teleological goal recognized by its universality and linear
trajectory, risks becoming the logic of transitional justice.28 Critics have rightly
argued that such approaches may reproduce a colonial logic, locating primitivity
or savagery in the organization of non-democratic regimes, even as liberal
democracies justify violence (against its own citizens and residents, and those
beyond its borders) as acts towards the defense of their democracies and the
evolution of an underdeveloped world needing their guidance (Chatterji et al.,
2016; Foucault et al., 2003; Restrepo, 2011).29 Time, in a sense, is compressed, as
long and complex histories of conflict are reduced to the violence of specific and
recent events. The toolbox approach to transitional justice may then be understood
as a simple application of prescribed solutions, a fix to an otherwise broken

Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History and the Last Man”, published in 1992, following the collapse
of these South American dictatorships and witnessing the end of the Cold War, argues that Liberal
Democracy represents the culmination of political evolution. As such, it represents the “End of History”
as a history of political development, time becomes the only true impediment to the fulfillment of a
colonial dream of global identity promising peace in the universal reflection of democratic values and
institutions thought to be achieved by so-called advanced Western Democracies.
28

It should be understood without saying that the very governments asserting the savagery of
undeveloped nations often actively and directly participated in their colonization and underdevelopment,
at times instituting anti-democratic regimes in the name of their own economic and political interests.
29
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society or failed state, to reproduce an order of justice already exemplified by
Global North liberal states (Hinton, 2011; Shaw, Waldorf, & Hazan 2010).
Postcolonial and feminist scholars of Transitional justice have argued for a
different approach to time and history (Mibenge, 2013). Transitional justice, per
their approach, cannot simply be the transition of a primitive state of violence to a
replicable and already known system of liberal governance. Instead, it must also
be transformative. Transformative justice, itself an emerging field within and
against Transitional justice, seeks the transformation of law, institutions, and
social relations in ways that address the root causes of conflict and both long
standing and future inequities within society, even those irreducible to human
right’s law (Chatterji et al., 2016; Daly, 2002). The relation to time, history, and
memory necessarily changes through this approach as transitional and
transformative justice must contend with “the present effects of the past as much
as it is dynamically informed by commitments to the future” (Chatterji et al.,
2016, p. 59). Openness is key to this understanding. Transition, for it to be both
meaningful for victimized-survivors of human rights violations, and
transformative of governance, must be in creative and collaborative construction
with those most marginalized by structures of state, economy, and society.
Conflicted Democracy
Colombia, in its implementation of the Peace Accord and approach
towards transitional justice, is acting on multiple registers. It has secured an end

43
to the armed conflict with the country’s largest and longest-running insurgent
force. In doing so, the government has committed itself to a process of political
transition, to address past violence and guarantee against future violations, and to
seek justice for human rights violations. The Peace Accord is not simply an
addressing of the law of war, or even of the effects of war, but is ultimately a
commitment to a “transition to a new regime of accountability for human rights
abuses” and a social and political transformation that opens space for non-violent
dissent and popular participation in governance while seeking to address the root
causes of the conflict (Iverson, 2014, p. 90).
Yet, here we confront a contradiction. In most transitional justice
processes, it is acknowledged that the former regime was authoritarian, nondemocratic, or at least so deeply compromised in its legal framework as to not
meet the requirements of a nominal democracy (Aoláin & Campbel, 2005).
Colombia, on the other hand, is one of the few Latin American states to have not
seen a formal suspension of its democracy (Palacios, 2006). In asserting the right
to negotiate with the FARC and implement the peace agreement, the government
has sought to invoke democratic institutions. A constitutional amendment passed
in 2012, established the legal right for the government to negotiate with the FARC
and create a structure for transitional justice. The Peace Accord was originally put
to a national plebiscite in October of 2016. Though voted down by a slim margin
and with a minority of the population casting ballots, the agreement was
renegotiated, taking into account the objections of the ‘No’ campaign, before
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ultimately being ratified by Congress in November of that year.30 The Accord’s
implementation continues to depend on Congress to draft laws in accordance with
what was negotiated. By depending on its democratic institutions and creating a
structure for institutional, social and political reform, the Colombian government
is pursuing a strategy of complementarity, where transitional justice becomes
integral to peacemaking (van Nievelt, 2016).
In successfully negotiating an end to the internal armed conflict with the
FARC, the Colombian government under Santos gained international
commendation for its commitment to peace, and for the strength of its democratic
institutions. Yet, the war in Colombia continues. Other guerrilla groups and
dissident former FARC factions persist in open conflict with military and
paramilitary forces, competition for control of coca production and trafficking has
increased violence in areas left vacant by the FARC, and international capital
continues to be complicit in forced displacement and selective assassinations in
energy, mining, and agricultural industries. Fundamentally, Colombia remains a
deeply divided society with high rates of economic inequality, racial and gendered
disparities, and corruption at all levels of government (Centro Nacional de

Much can and has been said about this plebiscite. Generally it is seen as a miscalculation by the Santos
administration, seeking confirmation of their approach through popular support. Its failure has been
alternatively explained by storms keeping turnout low, a complex and compromised political system that
depends on the local buying of votes, and the always present threat of political violence.
30
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Memoria Histórica, 2016).31 In stating that “Conflicted democracies in the Global
South may be characterized as political democracies that grapple with deep-rooted
dissension born of political and ideological differences that are historical, ethnic,
racial, economic, gendered, and religious in character”, the authors of Conflicted
Democracies and Gendered Violence might as well be describing the root causes
of the Colombian conflict (Chatterji et al, 2016, p. 20). These divisions, while
constitutive of violence in Colombia, have not resulted in the total collapse of
democratic institutions. As with other conflicted democracies, these institutions
often manage to function sufficiently for a portion of the population, particularly
for elites and the urban middle class, while failing to address the basic needs of
marginalized communities (Chatterji et al., 2016, p. 21). The participation of the
Armed Forces of Colombia in human rights violations and their complicity and
collaboration with paramilitary groups in mass violence against campesino,
Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities is testament to the uneven
distribution of state support to all of Colombia’s peoples (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2016). Complicity in paramilitary and military violence
extends to other institutions of governance as hundreds of national and local
politicians have been implicated in political violence and human rights violations
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2016). State and para-state violence

31 According

to OXFAM, 80% of land in Colombia is in the hands of 14% of the land owners, and that
concentration has grown over the last 50 years (Gillan, 2015). According to the World Bank’s GINI index
(the deviation of income in a country from a perfectly equal deviation), Colombia has the world’s 11th
highest unequal distribution of income, and the 3rd highest in Latina America after Honduras and
Surinam. See: https://www.indexmundi.com/facts/indicators/SI.POV.GINI/rankings.
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becomes a mechanism of order and exclusion, facilitating access to resources that
benefit ruling and ‘majoritarian’ classes while producing a national other defined
as a threat to prosperity and stability (Chatterji et al., 2016; Franco Restrepo,
2009). Majoritarian classes, in this usage, refers not to demography, but rather to a
structure of national identity consolidated and reproduced by an elite class that
positions its interests as national, and competing interests, such as ecological or
economic sustainability or cultural survival, as anti-national. Counter-insurgency
in Colombia is an explicit goal of governance, seeking to identify and punish
those guilty of the political crime of insurgency. The nation’s others, defined vis a
vis majoritarian nationalism, are often conflated with armed groups, legitimizing
the use of violence against them and denying equal access to structures of justice
and accountability. This logic extends to victims of state and paramilitary
violence. In the logic of counter-insurgency, only subjects of guerrilla violence are
rightly victims deserving of recognition and a fulfillment of their rights to truth,
justice, reparation and non-repetition. Victims of state and paramilitary violence
are conflated with guerrilla forces, either as disguised soldiers or willing
collaborators. The state’s commitment to the participation of victims in
transitional justice mechanisms runs afoul of the logic of counter-insurgency
creating confusion and contradiction in state processes that are typical of
conflicted democracies.
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The Local
These questions on the accessibility of resources, state support, and
structures of justice and accountability as well as the bifurcation of citizens
between loyal and subversive subjects underlie current efforts towards transitional
justice. The Peace Accord acknowledges the need to address these inequities and
proposes structural changes directed towards lessening the deep divisions in
Colombian society. Yet, political entrenchment, capital interests, and ongoing
conflict threaten to derail its implementation. Understanding the needs and
listening to the stories of those most proximate to violence, the victimizedsurvivors of human rights violations, is crucial in highlighting the importance of
the Peace Process and ensuring that it is implemented in ways that address the
conditions that produce violence and instability in Colombia.
Indeed, victimized-survivors of the armed conflict have been at the center
of advocating for the peace process from the beginning (Alcalá & Uribe, 2016;
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2017). Participating actively in civil
society and engaging with the state at all levels, victimized-survivors have
propelled the movement for human rights and long called for peace, justice, and
restitution. This constant pressure, channeled through regional, national, and
international human rights groups, has compelled the government to respond
through a series of legal initiatives and decrees that have created robust
transitional justice jurisprudence. Under these laws and policies, “victim” has
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become a legal category toward whom the state has particular responsibilities in
ensuring restitution, protection, and participation. Yet, throughout the last decades
of attempted peace negotiations, prior guerrilla and paramilitary demobilizations,
and projects for restitution and guarantees of non-repetition, victims’
organizations, as they are known nationally, have consistently denounced the lack
of their involvement in the drafting of laws concerning their rights and wellbeing. Worse, they argue that these initiatives have been either insufficient or
absent in their actual implementation.
In the absence of meaningful changes to the quality of life for victimizedsurvivors of armed conflict, regional human rights organizations claim that many
aspects of the current transitional justice program risks becoming mere theater. If
in a democracy, the state is understood as having the consent of the majority of its
citizens, for whom is transition performed? Is it for the majority to assure itself of
its own legitimacy in the face of a deep and protracted conflict with minority
dissenting communities? Or is it performed in the name of external witnesses, the
international community and foreign capital, that seek reassurance that the liberal
rights of both citizens and property are safeguarded in their interest? Teitel (2000),
in her constructivist approach, argues that justice is self-created through the
process of transition. Historical context, the balance of power and the politics it
produces, law and jurisprudence, institutional organization, and other factors
produce the conditions of possibility for both the emergence of a unique sense of
justice and its application. If we follow Teitel’s (2000) constructivist approach,
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must not all of these purposes, as well as others, be a part of the aim of transition?
For whom is transitional justice?
Scholars of transitional justice have increasingly argued for its localization
(Hinton, 2011; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008; Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). These
authors suggest that we must move away from the established binaries and
categories that have organized debates in the field. To juxtapose so-called
universal human values to local perspectives and needs, elides both the particular
history of their emergence, and the inequities that inhere in such a division.
Moreover, it robs us of creative possibilities to reshape and contextualize law and
practice in particular settings. The local itself cannot be abstracted from larger
national and international contexts. This is not only because those contexts
contour and constrain the local through structures and institutions that penetrate it
such as media, economy, and law but that to abstract the local within human rights
practice is to marginalize it (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). The local, rendered
peripheral to the universal, becomes conceptualized as a reservoir of culture,
antithetical to modernity, and separated from larger systems of thought and
governance (Restrepo, 2011). Thus, the local is conceptualized as a place from
which knowledge, particularly knowledge of human rights, cannot emerge.
Instead, scholars critical of universalizing approaches argue that the local is
indeed an important site for the production of knowledge (Chatterji et al., 2016).
It is not separate from the rest of the world, but rather provides a unique
perspective on it (Shaw & Waldorf, 2010). The local is not merely the site for the
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implementation of transitional justice, but a potential site for its
reconceptualization towards the transformation of society. In a conflicted
democracy such as Colombia, the addressing of inequity, that is, of the uneven
effects of the armed conflict, is essential for a successful program of transitional
justice.
Evaluation of such success cannot be a question of measuring whether
abstract and external qualifications are being met, but must emerge from the local
itself. A critical understanding of relations of power is crucial to this perspective.
While we recognize that it is precisely the uneven distribution of power that leads
to the reduction of transitional justice processes to mere theater, not benefiting
those most proximate to violence, we must also seek to understand how the local
itself is uneven. Relations of race, gender, sexuality, class, language, and
otherwise contour who participates at local level and who from there have an
entrance to national and international forums. If we refuse to abstract the local
from the larger world, we must also refuse to render it monolithic either across or
within local sites. Instead, critical scholarship must prioritize an analysis of power
in understanding transitional justice processes as they are conceptualized,
legislated, and implemented unevenly across society.

51
Chapter Three: Methodology
Restatement of the Purpose of the Study
International and national frameworks of transitional justice, understood in
the contemporary sense, are a relatively recent phenomena which emerged
following the Second World War and have only begun to take concrete shape in
the last few decades. Studies, thus, is a new field still in a process of
disciplination and formalization. Necessarily emerging as an interdisciplinary
field, Transitional justice Studies already draws heavily on social sciences
including sociology and anthropology. In particular, I employ post-colonial
participatory ethnographic and pedagogical methods in seeking to understand and
support the work of local researchers and advocates.32 Engaging with English and
Spanish language scholars, I focus on the experiences of victimized-survivors
turned researchers and advocates. Examining legal, institutional, and policy
frameworks, this study attempts to be an act of translation between various
archival, advocacy, institutional, academic sites that document the grounded work
of transitional justice. Through this work, I have supported the development of
research protocols for the evaluation of the implementation of the Peace Accord in
Medellín and Urabá, participated in workshops organized by state and civil

I name my methods post-colonial in the acknowledgement of the long history of social sciences
broadly, and anthropology in particular, serving as handmaiden to colonial and neo-colonial interests.
Taking seriously a critique of power relations is key to questioning this legacy. Participatory research, by
working in solidarity with local actors, seeks to undermine the traditional binaries of researcher and
researched, subject and object.
32
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society organizations, and conducted interviews with victim advocates and civil
society leaders.
Research Design
This study is ethnographic and participatory in its methodological
approach. Drawing from a rich and critical history of ethnographic research in
anthropology, including activist and engaged ethnography, this study can be
understood as having been undertaken in two phases (Chari & Donner, 2010;
Hale, 2008; Kirsch, 2018). In the first phase, I conducted participatory
observations and interviews to understand the history of CEPO. By attending
several of their meetings I gained an understanding of institutional dynamics, as
well as methodological and political commitments that helped shape several
workshops which resulted in the collaborative creation of a research protocol
designed to evaluate the implementation of the Peace Accord across five
municipalities of Urabá, Antioquia.33 Semi-structured interviews with CEPO
members deepened my understanding of how their personal histories led to their
participation in this work, a sense of their academic and organizing backgrounds,
and the importance of this research for the development of their organization. My
participation in CEPO’s study culminated in a preliminary research trip to Urabá
where we conducted interviews with demobilized FARC soldiers, state officials,
and community leaders.34 These interviews not only deepened my understanding
33

The meetings were on 3/3/18, 3/7/18, and 3/12/18.

34

The trip was conducted between 3/26/18 and 3/30/18.
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of the specific history of the conflict in Urabá but also provided the opportunity to
refine CEPO’s research design and interview protocols. Through CEPO, I also
gave a lecture on transitional justice in a Human Rights Education course at the
Universidad de Antioquia and organized a workshop for community leaders in
Apartadó.35
The second phase of the research consisted of in-depth semi-structured
interviews with victims’ advocates, civil society leaders, and state officials
concerning their personal histories, participation in transitional justice work, and
reflection on the Peace Accord and its implementation. In total, I recorded semistructured interviews with 20 individuals, and conducted several informal
interviews of which I took extensive notes. Participant observations also extended
to the second phase including several workshops and events variously held by
state institutions and civil society organizations. These included the first
departmental convocation of Victims’ Representatives in Cauca by the Victims’
Unit, a public event organized by victim’s organizations commemorating The
National Day of Memory in Medellín, an official meeting between the Truth
Commission and civil society organizations from Antioquia, and Re-tejiendo
Saberes, a formal discussion and workshop between representatives of state
institutions tasked with addressing the needs and guaranteeing the rights of
Victims (The National Police and Armed Forces, Ombudsman’s Office, Attorney
General’s Office, Solicitor General’s Office) and Victims’ Representatives and the
35

The lecture was given on 3/14/18 and the workshop was held on 3/26/2018.
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heads of women’s civil society organizations organized by Lawyers Without
Borders.
Participants and Data Collection
CEPO is a student- and faculty-led community research and teaching
collective at the Universidad de Antioquia (though not directly affiliated with the
university), created with the intention of contributing to the strengthening of the
social fabric of rural and urban communities in Antioquia, Colombia. Their work
is focused on building and documenting collective and cultural memory in ethnic
communities, supporting open and inclusive democratic participation,
consolidating the right to peace, and seeking the social well-being of local
communities. They have approached this vision through several projects including
the building of Peace Councils in both Medellín and Apartadó, researching the
implementation of a national Human Rights Education curriculum, participation
in electoral organizing supporting candidates and organizations dedicated to
implementing peace, and developing forums for public dialogues on Peace.36
In supporting the work of CEPO, I led a series of workshops which
resulted in the development of a complete research protocol for future
implementation.37 The research will inquire into the state of the implementation of
the peace accord in five municipalities of the Urabá region of Antioquia deemed

36

See Chapter Four for more background on CEPO and their work.

37

The workshops were conducted between 3/20/18 and 3/25/28.
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amongst the ‘most affected’ by the armed conflict, and thus requiring monitoring
and verification per the Peace Accord: Dabeiba, Remedios, Anorí, Ituango y Vigía
del Fuerte. This research will include interviews and focus groups with
community leaders, human rights defenders, local officials, students, teachers,
healthcare workers, and others and is to be conducted by a network of local
school teachers trained by CEPO team members. The data collected by CEPO
will be recorded and transcribed to form part of an archive gathered by the
Comisión de Seguimiento, Impulso y Verificación a la Implementación del
Acuerdo Final (Colombian Commission for Monitoring, Promoting, and Verifying
the Implementation of the Final Agreement, CSIVI) and the Instancia Especial de
Alto Nivel de los Pueblos Étnicos para el Seguimiento de la Implementación del
Acuerdo Final (Special High-Level Body with Ethnic Peoples for Monitoring
Implementation of the Peace Accords), bodies created by the Peace Accord to
ensure its full and just implementation, the later focused on guaranteeing the
rights of ethnic communities in this process. CEPO, as part of this process, will
use the data collected to write individual reports for each of the five
municipalities and a cumulative report on the state of the implementation of the
Peace Accord in Antioquia. In continued collaboration with this work, I
committed to translating and helping to circulate these reports.
In supporting the development of this research project, I accompanied
CEPO team members on a preliminary research trip to Urabá where we conducted
interviews and site visits in Brisas, Turbo, Apartadó, and a ZVTN near Brisas.

56
Over four days we interviewed the Community Leader of Brisas, a professional
mediator working with the UN, an envoy of the Colombian Armed Forces to the
FARC transitional zone, survivors of the La Chinita massacre,38 and other
community members including the president of the Community Action Board.
These visits helped to finalize the research and interview protocols we had been
developing.
Phase two of my research was situated in Medellín, where, through
personal referrals which began with long term relationships and extended through
my interviewees, I recruited Victims’ Representatives (themselves victimizedsurvivors), civil society leaders, and officials working with the Victims’ Unit to
participate in one- to three-hour semi-structured interviews. These interviews
focused on their participation in the implementation of the Peace Accord and
other transitional justice processes, what in their personal histories brought them
to this work, their sense of how the peace accord was being implemented, and its
effects on their communities, and their hopes for the future of Colombia.
Participants in these interviews were advocates, researchers, and officials
practiced in discussing these topics. My questions did not inquire directly into
personal histories of violence, or other human rights violations. Instead, they
focused on the aftermath of these violations particularly in the post-accord period,
Named after the neighborhood in the City of Apartadó where it occurred, La Chinita Massacre, is seen
as one of the worst atrocities committed by the FARC. On the evening of January 23, 1994, the FARC
massacred 35 members and wounded 17 at a community event, seeking revenge for the perceived betrayal
of former EPL (Ejército Popular de Liberación) soldiers who had since demobilized in an agreement with
the government (Unidad de Victimas, 2019).
38
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seeking to understand the work and the presence or absence of state institutions in
providing nationally and internationally guaranteed rights to truth, justice, and
restitution. I explicitly sought to avoid re-traumatization, centering the discussions
on the interest of participants in their work, expertise, and opinions on general
questions of transitional justice.
Validity and Reliability
While questions of validity and reliability are often underemphasized in
anthropological research, given its more immersive, critical, and dialogical
approaches, I will briefly address these issues. The question of validity gained
shape and substance as I began data collection. I want to be clear in stating that
my research in no way seeks to be objective. Rather, following traditions of
activist and engaged scholarship, my hope is that this work was meaningful and
relevant to the participants in reflecting on their work on transitional justice and to
the members of CEPO in their efforts to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of the Peace Accord (Hale, 2008). The meaning of this work will extend beyond
the research period in the form of continued solidarity. In particular, I have
committed to supporting CEPO in translating their reports and helping to circulate
them in the United States. Furthermore, the experience of this research informs
my continued advocacy and organizing.
Secondarily, I hope that such meaning and relevance extends to a larger
world of scholars, advocates, researchers, and policy analysis in their work to

58
critically understand human rights and support communities seeking to implement
transitional justice frameworks. The question of validity, then, must be asked in
relation to the much larger and salient questions of relevance and meaning.
Reliability, on the other hand, is a more concrete issue in relation to my
study. Seeking to frame my research and writing as a scholar in alliance with
victimized-survivors-advocates rebuilding communities and their way of life,
neither my data collection nor analysis could be conducted in the abstract
isolation of a properly trained subject. The interviews were semi-structured to
provide space for the interests and concerns of participants, inquiring into what
questions they found most relevant. Furthermore, I have been in contact with
several participants regarding the reliability of my transcriptions and my analysis.
My extended stay in Colombia facilitated this collaboration, allowing me to begin
data analysis concurrent to ongoing interviews and providing proximity to
interviewees to revisit interviews and discuss my findings.
Analysis
The analysis of my interviews, observations, and notes were genealogical
in the sense elaborated by Michel Foucault. In his 1975-1976 Lecture at the
Collége de France, Foucault (2003) describes genealogy as the union of
“disqualified” and “local” knowledges (p.8). In genealogy, subjugated
knowledges provide the content and contours of a history of the present, allowing
one to question not just the efficacy and effect of a particular discourse or social
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reality, say, transitional justice, but to trace its emergence. This gives us a sense
not simply of how it came to be, but rather to examine the conditions that led to
its emergence (Foucault, 2012). In particular, I am interested in the complex,
contradictory, and overlapping structures of governance that result in transitional
justice policy and implementation.
My study engaged with human rights advocates and social leaders to elicit
counter-memory as an intervention in dominant history (Foucault, 2012). More
importantly though, it evokes counter-memory in that the subjects of my research,
advocates and researchers, were not treated as transcendental signifiers speaking
to a universal human experience. Instead, I was interested in understanding how
they have been produced as subjects, both by the particularities of their individual
lives and the shared (if unevenly) experience of the armed conflict as well as their
perspectives on larger questions of transitional justice and their participation in its
mechanisms. How have their experiences shaped the way they understand
governance, the role of the Colombian state, and the political possibilities that will
shape their futures?
Further, I was interested in how their own efforts for justice have not only
contributed to their production as subjects, but have in turn, shaped discourse at
local, national and international levels in ways that have affected structures of
governance. What do these questions say about our shared (once again, unevenly)
present, in the sense of structures of nation-state that have become all but
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ubiquitous, and of transitional justice programs that have been or will be
implemented? As a “history of the present,” a Derridian attention to “the event,”
that which is unexpected and ruptures the present, was necessary as I seek to
place questions of participation in transitional justice in the complexities of the
present moment in Colombia (Derrida & Kamuf, 2002, p72).
Returning to genealogy, what role did subjugated knowledges have in this
analysis? To which local and disqualified knowledges did I refer? In this study,
Colombian scholarship, in a certain sense, is considered disqualified knowledge.
In what sense? In the sense that, global north, typically English language
scholarship, particularly in legal and sociological studies, seeks to establish an
objective authority based on its distance from the subject(s) being studied. As
such, Colombian scholars including those working at CEPO, other civil society
organizations, and the Victims’ Unit, who no doubt have a direct investment in the
outcome of the internal armed conflict, transitional justice processes, and
Colombian governmentality in general, are seen as too implicated, too imbricated,
and too motivated to produce truly objective knowledge. In fact, the widespread
disqualification of this scholarship needs not to depend on such a wellestablished, if absurd, justification. The inertia of global northern scholarship, that
is, its tendency to refer to itself as both reference and framework, is enough to
create a de facto disqualification, disqualification through ignorance (a product of
privilege) and assumed irrelevance.
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Local knowledge is fundamental to my methodology. Participants in this
study, as researchers, advocates, and victimized-survivors of the armed conflict,
are producers of local knowledge, experts on their own experience and of the
communities they work in. Relying on narratives of their experience, that is, on
counter-memory, my work seeks to destabilize more authoritative, more well
established, and ultimately more distant and unaccountable narratives that inform
state discourse and other dominant knowledges. As I addressed briefly above, the
initial interviews themselves influenced subsequent interviews. Recruitment of
participants depended on referrals of participants themselves, one interview
leading to the next.
Furthermore, the emphasis of my research questions necessarily changed
through my immersion in the work of my participants and their understanding of
what were key questions for transitional justice in Colombia. The destabilization
of dominant knowledges thus occurs not through my individual scholarly effort
but through the combined efforts of local communities and regional scholars
towards the production of meaningful and relevant narratives and understandings.
Summary of Methods
Participant Observations
Phase one: I attended CEPO team meetings, developed and led CEPO
research protocol development, lectured in a Human Rights Education course at
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the Universidad de Antioquia on behalf of CEPO, developed and led a workshop
in transitional justice for community leaders and advocates in Apartadó on behalf
of CEPO, supported a CEPO’s pilot study on the implementation of the Peace
Accord in Urabá.
Phase two: I attended the first departmental convocation of Victims’
Representatives in Cauca by the Victims’ Unit, attended a public event organized
by victim’s organizations commemorating The National Day of Memory in
Medellín, attended an official meeting between the Truth Commission and civil
society organizations from Antioquia, attended Re-tejiendo Saberes, a workshop
between representatives of state institutions tasked with addressing the needs and
guaranteeing the rights of Victims (The National Police and Armed Forces,
Ombudsman’s Office, Attorney General’s Office, Solicitor General’s Office) and
Victim’s Representatives and the heads of women’s civil society organizations
organized by Lawyers Without Borders.
Interviews
Phase one: I conducted interviews with CEPO team members,
collaborated in conducting interviews during CEPO’s pilot study in Urabá.
Phase two: I interviewed Victims’ Representatives to (municipal,
departmental, and national) Victims’ Councils, interviewed civil society leaders
including members of Ruta Pacifica and Redpaz, and interviewed officials
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working for the Victim’s Unit in Medellín. Table 1, below, lists interviews,
participant observations, and informal meetings for both phases.
Reflexive note-taking: A nightly discipline of reflecting on and
documenting the day of participant observation, as well as compiling and
transcribing the day’s notes.
Table 1
Table of Methods

Interviews
Position/ Title

Place of Interview

Date

Former Mayor of Brisas

Brisas, Urabá

3/18

Community President/ Victims’
Representative

Brisas, Urabá

3/18

Colombian State Mediator working
for the UN

Brisas, Urabá

3/18

Phase One

President of Transitional
Normalization Zone (ZVTN) Vereda ZVTM Vereda Brisas, Urabá
Brisas

3/18

Victimized-survivor of La Chinita
Massacre (Grandmother)

La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá

3/18

Victimized-survivor of La Chinita
Massacre (Grandaughter)

La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá

3/18

President of Community Action
Board of La Chinita

La Chinita, Apartadó, Urabá

3/18
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Coordinator for CEPO

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Researcher for CEPO

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Researcher for CEPO

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Researcher for CEPO

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Antioquia’s Departmental Victims’
Mesa - National Victims’ Mesa
Sexual Violence Committee

Plaza Mayor - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

President of Antioquia’s
Departmental Victims’ Mesa

UniSabaneta- Sabineta, Antioquia

4/18

Researcher for CODHES
Consultancy on Human Rights and
Displacement

Teatro Tobon - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Medellín’s Victims’ Mesa - TJ
committee

Museo de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Medellín’s Victims’ Mesa
Representative - Land Restitution
Committee

Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Medellín’s Victims Mesa
Representative - Women’s
Committee

Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Victims’ Unit Official - Reparations
Officer

Victims’ Unit Office - Medellín

4/18

Victims’ Unit Official - Transitional
Justice Officer

Victims’ Unit Office - Medellín

4/18

Founder and ED of Ruta Pacifica

Ruta Pacifica Office - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Ruta Pacifica: Urabá Representative Ruta Pacifica Office - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Phase Two
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Cauca’s Departmental Mesa National Victims’ Mesa Transitional Justice Committee

Santander de Quilichao, Cauca

4/18

Participant Observations
Event

Place

Date

Phase One
Workshop: Transitional Justice in
Local Communities. I presented and
led a discussion between advocates Community Center - Apartadó, Urabá
as requested by CEPO and local
organizers.

3/18

Inclusion in Early Childhood
Pedagogy Class: I lectured for two
hours on transitional justice and
constructivist pedagogy.

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Three workshops I developed and
offered on Methodology, Interview
Protocol, and Consent for CEPO.
These workshops led to the
development of the pilot study and

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

3/18

Community Meeting on Electoral
Organizing and Transitional justice La Chinita -Apartadó, Urabá
Observed and participated in
discussion

3/18

Phase Two
First Departmental Meeting of
Victim Leaders of Cauca Organized by Victim’s Unit

Santander de Quilichao, Cauca

2/18

Victim’s Day Event - Roundtable
discussion.

Teatro Tobon - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

First Meeting of Victim’s Leaders
with the Truth Commission.

Plaza Botero Hotel - Medellín Antioquia

4/18
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Re-tejiendo Saberes: Lawyers
without Borders (Montreal) Civil
Society and State Institutions.
Meeting to discuss attention to
Victims.

Hotel - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Informal Meetings
Position/ Title

Place of Interview

High School Student and Youth
Organizer

Turbo, Urabá

3/18

Professor of Political Science at the
Universidad de Antioquia

Universidad de Antioquia - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

National Adviser for REDPAZ: a
national peace Advocacy
Organization.

His home in Medellín - Medellín, Antioquia

4/18

Victims’ Leader - Cauca

Santander de Quilichao, Cauca

2/18

Victims’ Leader - Cauca

Santander de Quilichao, Cauca

2/18

Victims’ Leader - Cauca

Santander de Quilichao, Cauca

2/18

Feminist Poet and Activist

Poetry festival and her home in Medellín

4/18

Journalist working for
verdadabierta.com

Cali, Valle de Cauca

2/18

Hopefully this chapter helped to situate the reader in my research
experience, giving a sense of its immersion in a social world. It is from these
conversations and perspectives which I have structured the following chapters.
The work of CEPO frames the introduction and substance of Chapter Four,
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examining the constitutional basis for participation in governance in Colombia,
and its focus on the work of Municipal Peace Councils. Similarly, it is my longstanding relationships with representatives of the mesas that structured my inquiry
into participation broadly and into the work of the mesas in particular. These
state- formed structures, which are the foundation of victims’ participation in
transitional justice and subsequently, the Peace Accord, are the focus of Chapter
Five. This second findings chapter, where social facts are interwoven with
ethnographic reflections and the voices of interviewees, provides a structural and
grounded perspective on participation in transitional justice in Colombia.
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Chapter Four: The Right Of Participation and The Peace Councils
The policy of peace is a policy of the state, permanent and participatory.
(Law 434, art.1).
Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce the constitutional foundation for citizens’ participation
in Colombian governance. This legal innovation sets the stage for victims’ participation
in transitional justice discussed in the following chapters. Here, I focus on the work of a
university-based collective focused on research, advocacy, and organizing for democratic
participation, particularly in peace processes. Through participatory research, I supported
the development of a research protocol with this collective, leading to a pilot study that
helped refine the larger project and gave me some insight into the experiences of
victimized-survivors in Urabá, and their participation in Municipal Peace Councils.
Participation in the Constitution of 1991
CEPO, El Centro de Estudios Politicos, was formed in 2008 as students in the
political studies department at the Universidad de Antioquia developed a study group on
the political history of Colombia focusing on the notion of participatory democracy
elaborated in the Constitution of 1991. This current constitution of Colombia arose in the
aftermath of another peace process with the urban youth guerrilla group M-19, which
forced a recognition of the limits of the Colombian government to meet its
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responsibilities to its citizens39. A National Constitutional Assembly was formed, in
which commissions composed of demobilized guerrilla soldiers, civil society, including
representatives of ethnic and women’s organizations, alongside elected officials and legal
scholars, participated in the drafting and eventual ratification of a new Constitution.
Declaring Colombia a pluralistic nation, and establishing a new state of social right, it
was and is still seen as one of the world’s most progressive constitutions.
In this new legal foundation, citizen participation is understood as
crucial to address the issues productive of the recurrent national crises of
legitimacy and governability. At the time of the Constitutional Assembly, this took
the form of widespread corruption and clientelism of political classes due to the
influx of capital from narco-trafficking organizations and international resource
extraction and production (Rizo, 2011).40 Furthermore, participation was thought
to undermine a principal claim of legitimacy for guerrilla groups: the exclusion of
the majority of the population from representative governance, particularly youth,
labor organizations, as well as Afro-Colombian, Indigenous, and campesino
communities (Rizo, 2011).

The national impact of the Palacio de Justicia tragedy, where M-19 members entered the Supreme
Court of Colombia in 1985 taking over 350 workers and justices as hostages was particularly relevant.
The Colombian Armed forces and the National Police responded with a brutal siege that led to the deaths
of 98 persons and the enforced disappearance of 11 others. This act, later classified a massacre by the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, was televised nationally and included images of tanks
breaking through the main entrance, becoming an international scandal (Gómez Gallego et al. 2010).
39

There is little argument amongst Colombia political and historical scholars that these very conditions
persist today.
40
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The reordering of Colombia as a “democratic, pluralist, and
participatory” state sought to address the crisis of its representative governance by
recognizing the diverse character of its population, aligning with a global shift
towards human rights norms, and making participation a “constitutional value, a
fundamental principal, and a primary goal” of the Colombian State (Mosquera &
Cuesta, 2015, p. 60). The constitution itself establishes the legal foundation for at
least thirteen mechanisms for direct citizen participation in governance,
categorized by scholars as mechanisms related to the right to information,
mechanisms for “exercising control and correspondent judicial action” and
mechanisms for decision making (Cogollos & Ramírez, 2007, p.9). These
mechanisms include the right to tutela41, referendum, informed consent,
plebiscite, and impeachment (Mosquera & Cuesta, 2015, p. 66). The constitution
also calls for the creation of a variety of citizen’s councils, creating spaces for a
wide swath of civil society to participate directly in creating and reviewing policy
proposals. In the decades that followed the ratification of the new constitution
over 26 laws and 29 judicial directives have established the legal foundation for
over 50 mechanisms of citizen participation (Mosquera & Cuesta, 2015).

This direct citizen petition to the judiciary for legal remedy is often used by citizens and community
groups seeking to hold municipal and departmental governments accountable for the neglect or violations
of rights. For example, if the local police force refuses to file a citizen’s complaint against a police officer,
a tutela may be filed, reviewed by a judge, resulting in a judge’s order to accept the original complaint.
41
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Law 434 and Participatory Peace
In 1998, in accordance with the norms established under the new
constitution and the peace accord signed with the M-19 guerrillas, Law 434 was
passed by the Colombian Congress establishing the National Peace Council and
its affiliated Departmental and Municipal Peace Councils. The role of each of
these councils is to offer consultation and support to their associated level of
government in all issues relating to the construction of peace and to coordinate the
work of various institutions towards this end. These tasks include elaborating and
proposing strategies addressing issues of peace and human rights, suggesting
concrete actions to specific institutions, establishing priorities for the construction
of peace and the identification of places of greatest need, and organizing and
motivating citizen participation in peace processes including the creation of the
Peace Councils themselves. The councils thus seek to integrate community
members in the governance of peace, facilitating a direct connection between
institutions of state and local organizations. They are composed of civil society
representatives of women, youth, ethnic, cultural and arts, victims, media, labor,
business, LGBTI, displaced persons, religious, campesino, academic,
environmental, demobilized guerrilla and paramilitary soldier’s organizations, as
well as representatives of government institutions including the chief executive
(President, Governor, or Mayor), The Attorney General’s office, The
Ombudsman’s office, Legislators, Police and Armed Forces, Ministers, and
Representatives of other institutions tasked with implementing peace processes. In
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theory, these councils provide a space for direct participation of civil society in
building policies for peace and giving them access to the highest levels of
government, leading to greater investment by community organizations and
accountability on the part of the state.
CEPO’s Role in Supporting Democratic Participation
In the years following their founding in 2008, El Centro de Estudios
Politicos grew from loosely organized study groups of political science students
to an active collective organizing public dialogues: lectures and discussion groups
at the university, public libraries, city plazas and parks. These lectures and
community discussions sought to increase participation of marginalized groups in
democratic processes through educating the public on the structure of the state,
the Constitution, and mechanisms for participation, often by bringing this
information to the communities on the literal and figurative periphery of
Medellín. “We wanted to bring politics to the margins, to those people who are
forgotten about in political discourses, and who don’t see themselves as having
anything to go with government” (CEPO Coordinator, April 18, 2018).42
This work led the collective to developing strong relationships with local
officials in Itagüí, a municipality neighboring Medellín, through which they were
contracted to conduct an evaluation of the implementation of a national Human

42 All

interviewees are anonymous for the purposes of this dissertation due to the ongoing political
situation in Colombia.
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Rights Education curriculum in the municipality’s public schools. Through
interviews and focus groups they found that the majority of educators were
unaware of the program, and that the few who had tried to implement the
curriculum felt unsupported and under-resourced. Though disillusioned with their
findings, this experience recommitted them to and expanded their vision to
decentralize democratic participation and support peace processes at all levels of
civil society.
CEPO began participating directly in the construction of peace by helping
to organize Municipal Peace Councils across Antioquia. They reached out to civil
society organizations, primarily ethnic, youth, and women’s organizations,
encouraging them to participate in the creation of the councils. They offered
workshops to educate their representatives about Law 434, the larger peace
process, and their rights to create these councils as a vehicle for participating
directly in all issues related to building peace. Since 2012, CEPO has helped to
form Municipal Peace Councils in Itagüí, Vigia del Fuerte, and Murindo, and are
currently in the process of establishing a council in Apartadó. Furthermore, under
the auspices of Law 1622 of 201343, it has supported the creation of Youth
Councils in Apartadó and Itagüí.

The Estatuto de Ciudadan a Juvenil (Youth Citizens Statute) seeks to guarantee the rights of youth and
creates mechanisms for participation, including the creation of frameworks for National, Departmental
and Municipal Youth Councils. It is thus understood as part of the larger set of laws ensuring participation
in Colombia.

í

43
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They understand this work as central to their mission to help to construct
territorial peace. The founder and general coordinator of CEPO understands this
concept as an intervention on the centralization of government that has left access
to services and sites of power concentrated in the largest cities, principally Bogotá
and Medellín, ever deepening the divide between rural and urban communities.
The construction of territorial peace, in this context, concerns addressing inequity,
“to address the root causes of violence, the violence that people live every day, the
construction of peace must not be simply about economic development but human
development, and not simply in the capital, but in all of our territories” (CEPO
Coordinator, April 18, 2018). Territorios, territories, takes on a particular meaning
in Colombia given the intensity of the divide between the center and its margins,
the metropol and the periphery. Inequity, stark across Colombia, is exacerbated by
the lack of services, resources, security, and access throughout rural areas of
Colombia. In fact, the ungovernability of Colombia is often ascribed to its diverse
and difficult geography by more deterministic political scientists. Others,
including the political scientists of CEPO, argue that the lack of meaningful social
services is more of a reflection of the concentration of wealth and political power
by urban elites and large rural landlords, and a willingness to use military force to
suppress civil society efforts addressing inequities, than a fact of topography.
The question of peace for whom and by whom animates the work of
CEPO, as they seek to facilitate democratic participation through the creation of
Municipal Peace Councils. By connecting grassroots organizers from youth,
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women’s, ethnic, campesino, and arts organizations to local governance, CEPO
seeks to diffuse the tendency towards centralization in governance including in
peace processes. Participating on the councils helps community leaders to build
direct relationships with elected officials and institutional officers. Beyond the
stated work of the councils, to propose strategies for peace and review ongoing
processes, these relationships become crucial to issues in the day-to-day life of
communities. Calls for state intervention in moments where armed actors threaten
communities, for example, are taken more seriously and responded to quicker
when a personal relationship with the mayor or other officials can be called upon.
Participation in the councils also builds leadership and strengthens relationships
across civil society. Furthermore, the councils also provide local documentation of
the armed conflict and its effects, expanding our understanding of violence in
Colombia and helping to make clear the connections between the everyday
structural injustices of racism, sexism, and poverty and the long-lasting effects of
armed violence and human rights violations.
Financial and Political Limits of Participation in Peace Councils
According to Fundación Ideas Para la Paz (FiP), The National Peace
Council now has 98 members.44 62 of these members are a wide range of
representatives of civil society. The other 36 members are from the highest level

In 2015 there was an update to Law 134 of 1994 (The Mechanisms for Citizen Participation Law) in
Law 1757 of 2015 (The Promotion and Protection of The Right to Citizen Participation Law) which
expanded citizen participation by extending the number of participants on various councils, provided
special funds for some mechanisms, and lowered the threshold for the establishment of others.
44
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of government including legislators, ministers, governors, the mayors of the
largest cities, and the president. Since its founding in 1998, it has met more or less
regularly to address issues related to peace across the country, formulating
proposals and seeking to coordinate actions across government entities (FiP,
2016).
In comparison, of the 32 departments in Colombia only 18 Departmental
Peace Councils have been created. 13 of those councils were created in 1998, 4 in
2001, and 1 in 2004. Of those, only 6 are currently active. Of the 1,102
municipalities in the country, 177 have created Municipal Peace Councils of
which 41 are active (FiP, 2016). In their survey of Municipal Peace Councils FiP
found that a lack of interest (by civil society members and/or state institutions) led
to the inability to meet a quorum to create the council (FiP, 2016). In other cases,
there was simply an absence of municipal or departmental support. Lastly, they
found that in many municipalities other instances of participation, such as
Victims’ Mesas served similar functions as would a Municipal Peace Council and
were thus deemed redundant by local governments. Indeed, the legal scholars of
participation have argued that one of the principal obstacles to widespread citizen
participation is the complex and overlapping terrain of mechanisms that produce
ambiguous relationships between councils and procedures (Collogos & Ramirez,
2007; Mosquera & Cuesta 2016). This complexity leads to a sense that such
councils are superfluous.
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In interviews with CEPO members, the lack of consistent municipal
support was understood as the greatest barrier to the creation and continued
effectiveness of a municipal peace council. In an apparent paradox, the poorest
municipalities in which CEPO organized peace councils, Murindo and Vigia del
Fuerte, saw the Peace Councils fully funded and supported by the local
government with regular participation by its institutions including their mayors.
Both municipalities are near the border of Antioquia and Chocó along the Rio
Atrato, have majority Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations, and have
suffered long standing periods of armed conflict between guerrilla, para-military,
and the Armed Forces of Colombia.
During our pilot study, CEPO’s coordinator and I interviewed a former
mayor of Murindó who was also an active member of the Municipal Peace
Council. He, coordinating with local teachers and the current mayor, was
traveling to Medellín to petition the government in supporting the Peace Council
in the creation of two new school houses. “The old school building was already
deteriorating, full of mold and pests, it was a dangerous place to send our
children, and that was before the river took them in a flood”. He continued,
How are we supposed to participate in the peace process when we don’t
even have a place for our children to learn to read and write? It is true that
sometimes our representatives to the councils and other mechanisms lack
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the basic education needed to participate and defend our interests. (Mayor,
March 26, 2018)
I have heard this argument from others, that the inequities that organize
access to education across Colombia, have a profound effect on political
participation, as local leaders struggle with the requirements of their positions,
including reading and interpreting law, leading educational campaigns, drafting
public policy, and creating community archives. Representatives argue for more
equitable access to education for all of their communities as a key step towards
building sustainable peace processes and in particular ask for access to more
specialized education in law and public policy for representatives to meet the
demands of their positions.
On the other hand, in Itagüí, a municipality neighboring and directly
connected through light rail public transit to Medellín, CEPO was forced to put
forward its own resources to help build the Municipal Peace Council. It is telling
that the poorest of municipalities often find the resources to support peace
processes, while larger and wealthier cities fail to support community efforts.
It is that in the small communities, everyone depends on each other, even
the mayor needs everyone’s support. Not to mention that there are already so few
resources that everyone hopes that by participating they will bring more resources
for basic services.45
45

Interview with CEPO researcher.
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In Apartadó, a small city which serves as a principal commercial and
political center for the Urabá region, the process of establishing a Peace Council
is ongoing. While CEPO has also invested their own resources and time in
building the council, a shift in party rule at the municipal level has led to a lack of
support and at times active resistance to the creation of the council. The question
of political favor for particular mechanisms of participation is ever present. Given
that such councils are a meeting place between civil society and government
officials, they are often at the mercy of political parties. Political participation in
Colombia is popular, though often highly influenced by vote buying and political
favor. Local party representatives promise to turn out a given number of voters
and are in turn dispersed party funds with which to buy those votes, along with
the promise of support for local organizations. In Apartadó, civil society
organizations have formed an independent peace mesa which continues to petition
the local government for the creation of the council. The issue of voter
manipulation and vote buying is a crucial, yet largely unexamined one in
addressing the peace process in Colombia. Transitional justice depends on fair and
consistent implementation by national and local governments through political
transitions. Sadly, peace processes have most strongly been championed by the
traditional Liberal party, resulting in a reactive stance against them by right wing
parties, most prominently Uribe’s Centro Democratico. The issues of funding and
state support are key to questions of citizens’ participation in democracy broadly
and the peace process in particular.
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Para-politics
The phenomena of politicians, at all levels of government,
implicated in either direct support of armed groups, particularly para-military
forces, or in the political and business interests that underlie the ongoing violence
has become a national scandal in Colombia. The para-política scandal, as it is
known, came to be a national scandal in 2006 when a computer owned by a
paramilitary commander revealed pacts signed by politicians with paramilitary
groups to support their campaigns through voter suppression and political
violence in return for political favors and legal immunity (Verdad Abierta, 2010).
Indeed, Colombian scholars and journalists have documented hundreds of laws
passed by implicated politicians that directly support paramilitary interests
(Muñoz Gallego, 2019). The eruption of the scandal, fed by the testimonies of
paramilitary commanders and soldiers, many of whom were extradited to the
United States on drug charges once they began revealing their ties to political and
business elites, has led to dozens of investigations, many of which have lasted
over a decade. As early as 2013, over 50 representatives to the Colombian
congress had been condemned for their complicity with paramilitary forces
(Verdad Abierta, 2013). In 2019, the Prosecutor General’s Office announced that
it would seek charges against 5,000 persons, including judges, politicians, and
private business leaders under their ongoing para-politics scandal (Alsema, 2019).
This figure represents a major reduction in possible cases given that the previous
“Prosecutor General, Eduardo Montealegre said in 2015 that he had identified
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22,130 non-combatant state officials who allegedly sponsored the AUC or
indirectly took part in war crimes.” (Alsema, 2019, para. 2).46
This corruption, endemic to the politics of the Colombian right, suggests a
serious conflict of interest regarding their legally mandated support for human
rights process and transitional justice mechanisms. In particular, providing
platforms for participation, which elevate the voices of community members
seeking to address human rights violations, including efforts for justice and
accountability, reparation of damages caused by armed actors including the
restitution of appropriated lands, and the full implementation of the Peace
Accords which call for agrarian reform addressing issues of inequality across
rural regions, is in direct contradiction to the interests of paramilitary forces and
their allied political and business partners.
CEPO’s Pilot Study: La Urabá Antioqueña
Urabá is known for its extensive banana plantations and has been revealed
as an admonitory example of corporate and paramilitary collaboration leading to
extensive violations of human rights including targeted assassinations of labor
organizers, environmentalist, and community leaders and the mass displacement

Since then, these cases have been stalled. This is primarily due to new appointments to the Prosecutor
General’s office and accusations agains these very figures.
46
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of communities and appropriation of lands.47 There should be little surprise that
the political and business interests leading to this generalized state of violence
might produce contexts in which municipal governments would be adverse or
uninterested in supporting peace processes and the promotion of civil society
participation. This is particularly true in the context of programs of reparation
which would include the return of stolen lands that have been incorporated into
the banana plantation system, and truth processes that may seek to hold third
parties, that is those who provided material and logistical support to armed groups
in human rights violations, accountable.
With CEPO, we interviewed community members in Apartadó, including
survivors of La Chinita Massacre who spoke to a generalized sense among
community members that the government at all levels was unaccountable to their
rights and concerns. “They are all just interested in what helps them. They come
by and make promises, ask for our vote, maybe leave a few pesos, but they never
come back, and things never change or get better” (Grandmother, March 28,
The notorious Chiquita scandal is but one prominent example of the nexus between capital interests and
paramilitary violence. The United Fruit Company, directly implicated in the CIA overthrow of the
democratically elected government of the president of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, in 1954, leading to the
genocide of Mayan communities, later changed its name to Chiquita Banana. Chiquita had significant
interests in Urabá, Colombia’s chief banana growing region since the 1990s, coinciding with the
explosion of armed violence in the region. Through this period, the AUC, grew in strength and size in
Urabá, leading to the systematic murder of union workers and community leaders along with the mass
displacement of tens of thousands of persons, and the illegal acquisition of land then subcontracted to the
banana industry. In subsequent legal investigations by Colombian prosecutors, Chiquita admitted to
making over 1.7 million dollars of payments to the AUC for “security” between 1997 and 2004, the
height of AUC violence in the region (Torres & Vidal 2011). In 2018, Colombian prosecutors filed
charges against 13 employees of Chiquita banana for their support of the paramilitary death squads
(Semana 2018). Subsidiaries contracting with Chiquita continue to operate in the region and are accused
of having ties with the current paramilitary forces, the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC),
which continue murdering leaders and displacing communities.
47
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2018). They felt that both the national and local government was simply too
removed from their lives and concerns. “They don’t really know what happens
here, worse, they don’t care” (Grandmother, March 28, 2018).
What little support found its way into their communities was dispersed
through individual indemnities, small lump sums that sought to acknowledge and
minimally compensate victims of human rights violations for damages incurred
(Victims Unit, 2019). Registration as a victim, a prerequisite to individual
reparation, was often thought to make one vulnerable to targeting by armed
groups through a generalized notion that victims were allied with guerrilla groups,
or were a threat to armed organizations of any affiliation by seeking justice,
accountability, and a direct repatriation of land or other resources from the groups
themselves. “Registration, signals you, it makes you vulnerable” (Granddaughter
March 28, 2018). Just as troubling, interviewees reported a widespread sense that
corruption plagued the reparations process. “Those that come here are
transmitidores, they ask for money promising that they will get you registered and
that you will get your reparation. It never works that way” (Grandmother, March
28, 2018).48 Some asserted that despite having attempted to register as a victim
several times their applications were not accepted or processed. Indeed, they
claimed that access to individual reparations was tied to one’s political party
affiliation or personal relationship with local officials.

48

May be translated to transmitter or intermediary.
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CEPO, having long been involved in electoral politics,49 both as a way to
support candidates and parties in line with their political vision and often as a
source of revenue, decided, in long conversations following our pilot study, to run
their own candidate for the mayor of Apartadó. They blamed the stalling of the
establishment of the Municipal Peace Council directly on the then recently elected
mayor. They also interpreted the widespread mistrust of community members of
the peace process generally as a reflection of the corruption of the local
government, comparing the opinions and experiences of residents of Apartadó
with those of Murindo and Vigia del Fuerte. Seeking to balance empirical50
research and electoral organizing, CEPO team members understand, is a delicate
balance. Yet, they argued, given the lack of state support through direct funding of
smaller scale efforts such as theirs, they are left with little option than to seek
funds through electoral organizing for political parties aligned with their vision.
They, like many Colombians, believe that the political system is indeed rife with
corruption, but seek through their aspirations to participate directly in local
governance to bring transparency and accountability to state power at a crucial
time in the peace process. “It is what we have left, not only supporting
government, but becoming government” (CEPO Coordinator, April 18, 2018).

The postponement of CEPO’s complete investigation on the state of the implementation of the peace
accord was a result of the loss of a Green Party candidate to the Colombian Senate. Having organized for
this candidate for months, they were refused a complete payment for their work following the loss. The
candidate’s campaign argued that given their loss they neither had the funds nor the obligation to pay
CEPO. The lack of funds resulted in the inability to move forward with a complete investigation as
planned for the time being.
49

50

See Methodology for an explanation of CEPO’s understanding of “the empirical”.
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This chapter has highlighted many of the structural and bureaucratic limits to
effective participation as mandated under Colombian law. In closing, I summarize some
of these findings. Regarding logistical and financial obstacles, lack of the required
political support for the creation and maintenance of Peace councils and the dependency
of the creation of Municipal Peace Councils on the authorization of local mayors, in
particular locations, stifles the efforts of civil society. The lack of municipal support in
the form of physical and financial resources at times limits the ability of civil society to
form Municipal Peace Councils as well as limits the ability of individual members to
participate. Supports include the availability of a secure site to hold meetings and access
to basic technology including computers and cellular phones. Once established,
representatives of Peace Councils complain about the personal cost of participation,
noting the lack of any subsidy for transportation or time, leading to a financial burden and
lost wages, for already marginalized communities. Furthermore, confusion as to the
diversity of possible mechanisms for participation left some community members unsure
of how to address a particular issue, or where to start to get involved with local
government. Scholars have documented how overlapping laws and institutions lead to
bureaucratic confusion as well, complexifying communication and coordination with
community groups.
Participation in peace processes in general and Peace Councils in
particular has political consequences. The consequences can be particularly grave
given the violence and corruption that surrounds Colombian politics. Interviewees
stated that participation, or even simply registering as a victim of the armed
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conflict, a prerequisite for reparations and some forms of participation, marks you
as a potential guerrilla sympathizer, leading to targeting my official and
paramilitary forces. There were widespread concerns about corruption by political
parties and individuals taking advantage of victimized-survivors. The corruption
of political parties is understood as systematic and de facto. Many assume that
politicians and their parties are power-hungry and use transitional justice as a way
of advancing their careers over addressing past and actual violence. There is also
a generalized suspicion by some victimized-survivors that some victims’
organizations, or at least some individuals within them, stand to gain personally
from their work.
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Chapter Five: Mesas De Participación Efectiva
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I introduced the constitutional basis of citizen
participation in Colombia, noting its historical context including its emergence
from peace processes, civil society’s role in its drafting, and the central and
diffused role that participation has in the document. From there, I introduced the
work of CEPO, and in particular, their support for the establishment of Peace
Councils, an early but important mechanism for citizens’, including victims’,
participation in the construction of peace. Lastly, in conversation with
interviewees, I offered an understanding of the limits of participation in local
governance and in particular in transitional justice mechanisms. These limits are
grounded in the experiences of local leaders and community members in the
Urabá region of Antioquia. In particular, they reflect the frustrations and
suspicions of victimized-survivors of the armed conflict. These feelings often
arise from personal experience with local, regional, or national institutions and
they describe a pattern of hope and disappointment in relation to legal and policy
advances that fail to produce significant improvements to daily life. I ended that
chapter with a summary of findings, a descriptive list of the limits of participation
as described by my interviewees.
In this chapter, I describe the experiences of persons intimately involved
with transitional justice: victimized-survivors of the armed conflict who have
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become deeply involved in organizing and advocacy, leading to their participation
in a more recent, but now central, mechanism of participation, Las Mesas de
Victimas. I begin with my notes from a participant observation of an important
event, the first department-wide meeting of representatives of the mesas in Cauca,
Colombia, one of the departments hardest hit by the armed conflict. Through this
short narrative, I provide an example of what participation itself feels like, from
the perspective of many of the leaders I spoke with. From this vignette, I return to
law, giving a detailed description of Law 1448 (Victims’ Law), a key statute in the
legal definition of a Victim, and a foundation to current structures of transitional
justice. Indeed, much of the current Peace Accord relies and builds upon
structures of participation established under Law 1448. I then turn to an extended
description of an interview with a representative to the national mesa, a leader
with extensive and varied experience organizing, advocating for, and now
representing victims with a national and international platform. This description
takes time to describe the context of her life before, during, and after a life
altering episode of violence. My interviewee insisted that I understand this larger
context, precisely to be able to glimpse the loss she experienced, and to
understand how it continues to shape her life and work, including the challenges
she faces as a representative to the national mesa.
Lastly, I take time to review some limits and difficulties to participation in
transitional justice as described by the various representatives I interviewed. In
this summary of findings, I refer back to the participant observations and
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interviews present in this chapter, highlighting the critique of effective and
meaningful participation that they offer. I end with an examination of the gravest
hinderance to victims’ participation in Colombia - the mass and systematic
murder of human rights defenders and community leaders. This chapter and the
last serve the purpose of answering my first two sets of research questions
regarding an examination of laws and institutional structures for participation and
the experiences of representatives and community members in the implementation
of these mechanisms.
The First Departmental Meeting of Victims’ Representatives of Cauca
We awoke to the familiar sounds of the Colombian countryside: roosters
crowing, a myriad of insects buzzing, a stereo blasting cumbia in the distance. I
had arrived the night before and was immediately offered dinner, joined by people
eager to eat and talk as we looked out on the verdant moonlit valley. The
conversation turned on shared and divergent experiences of the armed conflict,
the ways in which it has intimately affected their lives, weaving a grounded
understanding of how national and local politics contributed to their life history
in complex and problematic ways (or sometimes not at all). My bunkmates were
social leaders and human rights defenders, delegates to their local mesas de
victimas, almost exclusively from rural communities across Cauca. They were
gathered here in a finca outside of Santander de Quilichao for the “First
Departmental Meeting of Victim’s Representatives of Cauca.” Some, from the
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more remote communities on the Pacific Coast or the small mountain villages of
the Western Andean Cordillera, had traveled for days by foot, boat, and bus to tell
their stories of the armed conflict and to represent the needs and concerns of their
communities.
Regional breakout groups of the approximately fifty participants,
organized the morning’s discussions with volunteers writing down the issues they
had come to discuss: the needs of demobilized FARC soldiers, the lack of health
clinics and schools, cocaine production and the need for state supported crop
substitution, disappeared persons and the search for their remains, mass
displacement from armed groups fueled by mining and narco-traffic, the ongoing
threats to and murders of leaders just like themselves. The discussions were
heated as participants argued for the needs most relevant to their community,
even as they tried to find common ground to propose meaningful interventions.
The stakes felt high as this was, for many, the first time they were meeting with
national level government officials. In the wake of the signing of the Peace
Accord, they had led campaigns in their communities, educating others on the
commitments of the government to ensure a just transition away from the armed
conflict. As they fought to spread hope, they also took on the weight of their
responsibility to represent others and to help bring tangible positive change.
Just as the morning discussion groups were closing and the participants
were beginning to establish a methodology to determine which issues would be
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prioritized in their report to the government, national representatives of the
Victims’ Unit arrived. They brought lunch with them, insisting that everyone break
as a special surprise was on its way. A couple of hours later, Frank Pearl, an
economist and politician who was a principal negotiator of the Peace Accord,
arrived. He spoke at length to the historical context and significance of the
signing of the accords, the promise of peace, the commitment of the government to
address the root causes of the conflict, and the crucial role that victims would
play in the process. The representatives listened politely, but jumped at the
opportunity to ask questions: “Why are you talking about the end of the conflict
when people in my community are still being threatened and killed?” “What
about the cases of harassment and rape of women committed by the armed
forces?” “Why is my community having to feed and shelter demobilized FARC
soldiers, where is the state support?” Frank Pearl listened carefully and
responded candidly acknowledging the questions and claims of representatives
and stating that there is so much to do and that he was personally committed to
seeing the accords meaningfully implemented.
The staff of the Victims’ Unit anxiously stepped in to dismiss Mr. Pearl and
set the agenda for the rest of the meeting. Their roles, the staff announced to the
representatives, would be crucial in the months to come. Their leadership would
come to constitute the foundation of state interventions to ensure a peaceful end to
the armed conflict. The success of the peace process rested on their shoulders.
Therefore, the rest of the meeting would be leadership training.
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Realizing that their agenda had just been hijacked, many of the
representatives left. The ones that stayed, listened to a series of powerpoint
presentations and participated in small group discussions on what qualities
constitute a great leader. They were asked to think of a leader they admired and
write down words that described them. Lastly, everyone was to lay down on
butcher paper and have their outline drawn to then write in adjectives describing
leadership qualities. One by one everyone presented their chalk outline, stories of
the leaders they admired were interrupted in the name of everyone having a
chance to present. Their moving narratives of personal inspiration, symbols of
resistance, and concrete practices for organizing and advocacy were reduced to a
string of adjectives. Photos of participants were taken for the Victims’ Unit’s
website. The event ended without documentation of the concerns representatives
had come to share. The symbolism was dense in the air, particularly in regards to
the chalk outlines, though perhaps not in the way that the Victims’ Unit organizers
had intended.
The leaders I spoke with as the event wrapped up all expressed a similar
sentiment, “this is how all of our meetings go. They only get us together to take
our picture, all they want is to show that we were here and that something is
happening.” (Excerpt from Field Notes, 2/21/18)
Addressing my second research question regarding the experiences of
participants in transitional justice mechanisms, this vignette points to several key
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issues that I return to later in this chapter: top-down decision making regarding
the agenda of meetings, the inability of representatives to participate directly in
the implementation of policy on issues affecting their communities, and their
sense that many mechanisms for participation are geared towards generating
positive media over actually addressing concrete issues. The symbolism of the
chalk outline for victimized-survivors and social leaders, if not already, will
become clear in Chapter Six.
Victims’ Law 1448
The confluence of legal efforts to expand democratic participation as
impelled by the Constitution of 1991 and social movements’ efforts towards the
development and implementation of peace processes in Colombia produced a new
standard for transitional justice in Colombia under 2011’s Victims and Restitution
of Lands Law 1448.51 This measure is still seen as a rare example of an attempt to
implement transitional justice, guaranteeing rights to victims of human rights
violations, during an ongoing armed conflict. Furthermore, by formally including
all victims of the armed conflict and making the creation of participatory
mechanisms mandatory, Law 1448, both built upon and expanded the right to

This, of course, is in no way a complete description of the development of participatory mechanisms
for peace or for victims’ involvement. In particular, Law 387 of 1997 on the rights of Internally Displaced
Persons, created a framework for participation upon which Laws 1448 was built and expanded upon.
Furthermore, the so-called Justice and Peace Law, itself a transitional justice framework for paramilitary
demobilization, included several participatory provisions for victims. These provisions were largely
related to victim’s participation in truth tribunals, and processes for the creation of historical memory and
symbolic reparation.
51
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participation and peace enshrined in the Constitution and developed through the
two decades of jurisprudence (de Waardtm & Weber, 2019).
Within Colombia, the law is broad in its scope and was crucial in several
key acknowledgments. Article 1 of the Law states that its objective is to:
…establish a conjunct of judicial, administrative, social, economic,
individual and collective measures to benefit victims… in a transitional
justice framework that makes possible the enjoyment of their rights to
truth, justice, and reparation with the guarantee of non-repetition,52 in a
way which recognizes and dignifies their condition as victims through the
materialization of their constitutional rights. (Ley 1448, art. 1)
It recognized an on-going armed conflict, something the previous president,
Álvaro Uribe had refused to do,53 referring instead to internal criminal and
terrorist actions that demanded a militarized police response. Under this state of
affairs, a negotiated end to the conflict was impossible as there was no
understanding of the rights or bargaining capacity of other armed actors. In

The addition of the right to non-repetition is particularly notable, addressing critiques of previous
transitional justice processes that have been mired by ongoing violence. Sadly, this novel legal standard
has yet to be implemented in a meaningful way.
52

In 2007 the Colombian Senate passed Law 157, which was vetoed by then President Uribe. This “Ley
de Victimas” was objected to by the executive in part because he believed that reparation was unfeasible
but also because it acknowledged the internal armed conflict (Acuña, 2012).
53
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acknowledging the armed conflict, Law 1448 invoked the rights to International
Humanitarian Law (IHL),54 and the state’s responsibilities under it.
Secondly, it recognized the existence of victims of the armed conflict. This
produced the legal category of Victim, assuring individual and collective rights to
protection, reparation, truth, and justice as well as effective participation (Ley
1448). It also recognized that one could be a victim of either state, guerrilla or
paramilitary violence. Until then, the state, as well as other armed groups,
regularly denied the existence of victims of their actions, referring instead to
victims of individual criminal actions or simply, the collateral damages of war.
This generalized a state of suspicion by armed actors of those who claimed status
as victim, raising the specter of their collaboration with other groups.
The law defines a Victim as a person or collective that has suffered a
violation of International Humanitarian or Human Rights Law on or since 1985
(Ley 1448, art. 3). Intimate partners and first degree family members of persons
who have been subject to extrajudicial execution or enforced disappearance are
also included (Ley 1448, art. 3). To be eligible for land restitution, the violation
resulting in territorial dispossession must have occurred on or after 1991 (Ley
1448, art. 3). Members of guerrilla or paramilitary groups are ineligible to register
as victims unless they were minors at the time of their demobilization (Ley 1448,
International Humanitarian Law, based in the Geneva Protocols, emerged following the devastation of
global war in the mid-20th century. It sets international standards for the protection of non-combatant
civilians as well as establishes limits to the waging of war and other conflicts. The Colombian
government’s acknowledgment of an internal armed conflict is key to human rights advocate’s invocation
of IHL in asserting the need for protection and reparation. For an introduction to IHL see: www.icrc.org.
54
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art. 3, para. 2). Under the law, all victims must first register with the “Special
Administrative Unit for the Assistance and Integral Reparation of Victims,” an
entity established under Law 1448. Registration entails presenting a formal
declaration of the violation and supporting evidence to the unit (Ley 1448, art.
154-156). This process explicitly overturns the precedent that a perpetrator be
identified and convicted before a victim may be registered and for rights be
granted to that victim.55 Once registered, all victims are entitled to a range of
social services including education, mental and physical healthcare, preferential
rights to government employment, job training, and housing subsidies, and rights
to legal counsel to seek damages (Summers, 2012, p. 227).
Mesas for Victims' Participation
The accessible and effective participation of the victims, as designated by
this law, in the design, implementation, execution, and evaluation of governance
is guaranteed at the national, departmental, municipal, and district level. (Ley
1448, art. 193)56
In addition to legally defining the status of a Victim, Law 1448 established
the Victims’ Unit, an institution tasked with coordinating all assistance and
55A precedent

established by the “Peace and Justice Law” (Law 975 of 2005). This law ostensibly
demobilized members of the nation’s largest paramilitary umbrella group the AUC. Advocates and
scholars contend that this demobilization was at best incomplete, instead resulting in the fracturing of
paramilitary factions while maintaining relations to the political and business interests that financed and
supported their violent work.
My translation. Original text: “Se garantizará la participación oportuna y efectiva de las víctimas de las
que trata la presente ley, en los espacios de diseño, implementación, ejecución y evaluación de la política
a nivel nacional, departamental, municipal y distrital.”
56

97
reparations measures guaranteed by the state and creating mechanisms for
“effective participation” of victims in these processes (Victims’ Unit, 2019).
Towards this effort and under the direction of Law 1448, the Victims Unit
supports the creation and coordination of the Mesas de Participación Efectiva de
Víctimas.57 The law defines the creation of mesas at the national, departmental
and municipal level. Coordinating with the Victims Unit, the national and
departmental Ombudsman Offices (Defensoria) and the municipal Solicitor’s
Offices (Personería) are tasked with supporting the establishment of these mesas
and functioning as their Technical Secretaries (Berrío, 2014). They maintain a
registry of state recognized Associations of Victims,58 from which candidates may
be endorsed for locally regulated elections to the mesas. Representatives to the
mesas must also be registered in the National Victim’s Registry. Thus, all
participants in the mesas, are both victims of the armed conflict, and leaders in
their local communities and victim’s organizations.
The mesas have 24 to 26 seats, a requirement of the law meant to provide
a wide diversity of representatives. Many of the seats are reserved based on
hechos vicitzantes and sectores victamizados (de Waardtm & Weber, 2019).59

57

Effective Participation Councils of Victims

These associations are civil society organizations of victims, many established before the passing of
Law 1448, that educate and organize victims of the armed conflict and of human right’s violations on
their legal rights and to advocate for their interests.
58

Hechos vicitzantes (victimizing acts): victimized survivors of particular human rights abuses such as
gendered and sexualized violence, forcible displacement, the enforced disappearance of a family member.
Sectores victamizados (victimized sectors of society), that is vulnerable populations, based on ability, age,
gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation.
59
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Representatives elected to the mesas serve for two years, up to two terms.
Following their term, popular representatives often move on to serve at the
departmental and national level mesas.
Each at its own level; municipal, departmental and national, the mesas
share common purpose and function. They are first and foremost a space for
representatives of victims’ associations to discuss and propose programs for the
education, accompaniment, and reparation of victims. Ideally, the mesas serve as
a mechanism for the everyday and exceptional concerns of victims, rural or urban,
to be integrated into social and political discourse. It has served as a mechanism
by which the failures of state institutions have been documented and publicized,
communities and agencies have been made aware of the emergence and expansion
of armed groups and human rights violations and where the daily struggles of
poverty, racial and gendered targeting, and lack of infrastructure have been
understood as both reason for and exacerbated by the armed conflict. The
documentation of progress, or lack thereof, in the implementation of processes of
reparation, is a legally mandated function of the mesas, and has resulted in the
creation of a large archive of documents and reports describing the ongoing state
of affairs in the construction of peace across the country. The mesas have been
most successful in producing educational campaigns raising awareness of
transitional justice broadly, and the peace accords specifically, demystifying, to a
degree, the complexities of government institutions, and disseminating
information about victims’ rights.
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Each mesa, according to the law, must also produce an annual Work Plan,
detailing its meetings, the focus of their work for each period, the activities they
plan on conducting, and a detailed schedule for their development. Lastly, the law
stipulates that each mesa, through its existence, serves as a site for the “effective
participation” of victims, creating a space for victims of various backgrounds,
experiences, and locations to come together, share, and organize. The question of
how effective such participation is, of what it is effective, and of how that
effectiveness is to be evaluated is not addressed in the law. The mesas are, in fact,
explicitly not decision-making spaces. They have no power over state agencies or
programs, and exist simply to provide a space for discussion, documentation, and
the development of proposals.
The mesas though, do have the right and obligation to elect representatives
to specific bodies that are endowed with a degree of decision-making power over
transitional justice policy and its implementation. The national Mesa elects
representatives from its members to serve on The Directive Counsel for the
Special Administrative Unit for Stolen Lands, The Executive Committee for
Attention and Reparation, The Commission for Accompaniment and Monitoring,
and the Directive Counsel for the Center of Historic Memory.60 Each of these
bodies brings together politicians and officials across government institutions to
design and implement transitional justice processes. At the departmental and
Consejo Directivo de la Unidad Administrativa Especial de Restitución de Tierras Despojadas, the
Comite Ejecutivo de Atención y Reparación, the Comisión de Seguimiento y Monitoreo, and the Consejo
Directivo del Centro de Memoria Histórica
60

100
municipal level these, and other related functions, are coordinated through the
Comités Territoriales de Justicia Transicional (TJCs).61 Legally, these committees
are understood as having the “maximum responsibility for the coordination,
application and design of public policy in the department, municipality or district,
presided over by the governor or mayor respective to victim’s rights” (Victims
Unit, 2012, p.7). They are charged with developing a Plan of Action under each
government’s annual Development Plan for the implementation of transitional
justice, particularly all issues related to guaranteeing “attention, assistance y and
integral reparation to victims” (Victims Unit, 2012, p. 7).
Like the Peace Councils created by Law 434, the transitional justice
Territorial Committees bring together a wide representation of government
officials and politicians.62 As such, they represent a key nexus for victims’
representatives, the perspectives and concerns compiled through the mesas, and
the various institutions of government tasked with ensuring access to transitional
justice for victims of the armed conflict. These Transitional Justice Committees,
in effect, are the executors of transitional justice programs, being one of the few
institutional bodies empowered with a budget, and the capacity to coordinate
government actions.
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Transitional Justice Territorial Committees

Participation by the governor or mayor, their secretary, the secretaries of Planning, Health, Education,
the regional commander of the Armed Forces, the commander of the regional Police Force, the regional
director of Bienestar (Social Services), a representative of the Public Ministry, a delegate of the Victims
Unit, and two representatives of the mesas are required under law (Victims Unit, 2012). In practice, these
meetings rarely have all required members.
62
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Interview with Yanela63
It was, as usual, a hot day in Medellín when we met at a Plaza Mayor in
Medellín. I was catching Yanela between meetings. She was coming from a
television interview and had a few hours to talk before a fundraising meeting
seeking to secure funds for a water pump and filter for a community of displaced
persons in Riosucio, Chocó. I sat in the breezy shade of a large tree as she stepped
out of her ride, a large black SUV with bullet proof glass and two armed guards.
This was the highest level of the government’s Protocolo de Protecctión for social
leaders under threat by armed groups.64 Lesser degrees of protection include a
state funded cell phone with the local and national police on speed dial, or a
bulletproof vest to wear when leaders leave their home. Other leaders have told
me about their ambivalence towards these measures. The lesser measures are a
joke they say, “What will a cell phone that doesn’t work outside of the cities and
towns do where I live? Particularly, when there isn’t trust in the police’s
willingness or ability to respond to threats of violence”. The armed guards often
build personal relationships with the leaders, granting a degree of trust but it also
creates a distance between the leader and their communities. “How does it look
for me to ride around in a fancy car with armed men? It makes me look like the
very people we are working against” (Cauca’s Departmental Representative, April
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Pseudonym. Representative on Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa and the National Mesa.

This “Protocol of Protection” is one of the governments programs to protect participants in transitional
justice and other social leaders. The limits and problematics of this program are addressed in this and the
next chapter.
64
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18, 2018). Various leaders have communicated that it leaves them with a sense of
isolation, of disconnection from the communities they represent, and that it opens
the possibility for closer surveillance of their work. If participating in transitional
justice leads to persecution by armed groups, which then requires that leaders
resort to protection schemes that cast suspicion on them for the communities they
represent, is there effective representation through participation?
After a few friendly greetings, the guards asked to see and photograph my
ID before walking away a short distance to keep watch during our interview.
Sitting down under the tree we shared updates on mutual acquaintances and went
through the interview protocol but before we got into the questions. Yanela
interrupted, “I want to tell you about where I grew up. I want you to know that I
live through my memories”. She described a childhood filled with beauty and
wonder: a home built on a small island between two rivers surrounded by sandy
beaches, trees filled with coconuts and guavas, easy fishing right down from her
doorstep, a large community-run farm with corn, sugar cane, and plantain. She
was raised by her mother and grandparents, the elders of their village, in the casa
madre. Lost in her memories, she described a safe, loving, and egalitarian
community where children played into the night without fear, families shared
what each house produced and no one went without food and shelter, and
conflicts were resolved through caring mediation by the larger community.
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Yanela reflects on the joy and privilege of this childhood, “This was a
dream, my dream, that I woke up from to confront the armed conflict that had
been destroying other’s lives for decades”. Armed groups began to make regular
appearances in her community, each demanding support, and threatening reprisal
for supporting others. Over time the FARC established a command center nearby
and gained control of the area. They began visiting the caserio, demanding that
the families sell them food.65 This drew Yanela’s community into what is known
as la zona gris, the gray zone, an apparent, if forced, participation in the conflict
through material support for an armed group. This gray zone is a key
problematically named by victimized-survivors and their advocates in
participating in transitional justice programs which often assume a clean division
between victim and perpetrator.
One day, two soldiers found Yanela alone in her home and sexually
assaulted her. Her mother found out and, against the protests of the rest of the
family, went and complained to the FARC commander. Days later, several
soldiers, including those involved in Yanela’s rape returned, attacked her home,
murdered her mother and uncle, and displaced the rest of her family. Over the
next few years, the displacement led her and her family from a military camp of
hundreds, to a refugee camp with thousands of others, to an apartment in
Apartadó, the local city. There, she began working as a domestic worker and met

65 A collection

of homes forming a community but too small to be considered a village. These types of
residences for communal living are common throughout rural Colombia.
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a man who became her husband and together they had two children. She felt like
her life was finally coming together. Yet, through these years, she began to feel
the weight of the trauma she had experienced, as it came to affect all of her closest
relationships, including with her husband and young children. She was living in a
routine, but without a sense of presence, joy, or hope. “Gone were the days of my
childhood, of joy, of being a strong outspoken girl. I lost my voice through those
days of violence. I lost my will to live”.
It was in 2003 that a friend approached her, “They are starting to organize
victims of the conflict and some people are being given homes” (Yanela, April 4,
2018). Though Yanela had no desire to participate in victims’ organizing, she was
tired of living with her mother-in-law and agreed to go. “Well, I left there without
a new place to live but that initial meeting changed my life. From that day I
started receiving care from a psychologist at the hospital in Apartadó”. The
psychologist visits were scheduled for every eight days, but she insisted on going
every day. “It was through those visits that I began to heal, began to understand
that everything that had happened to me was not my fault. It was this experience
that started me off organizing with victims”.
She began by working at a food bank and organizing the delivery of food
to displaced persons and resettlement camps in Riosucio. Her organizing led her
to Medellín, as she continued to pursue support for the communities of Chocó, all
the while working several administrative jobs in factories and as a domestic
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worker in private homes. It was in this period that the threats began. Calls telling
her that what happened to her mother could happen to her. Calls stating the figure
of the small sum it would take to have her murdered in Medellín or in Apartadó.
Instead of backing away, she redoubled her efforts, seeking the support of
Ruta Pacifica, a national women’s organization addressing the armed conflict, to
start her own women’s organizing and advocacy victim’s organization in Rio
Sucio, Chocó in 2011. Her mother’s image became the symbol of the
organization, seeking to educate women on their rights as victims of the armed
conflict in transitional justice mechanisms and in creating grassroots projects to
address issues of everyday violence. In 2013, she was invited to travel to Spain to
highlight the plight of women and survivors of gendered and sexual violence
under the armed conflict. Through this experience, local organizations nominated
her to run for seats on the local, departmental, and national Mesas de Victimas.
She won the slot for each of the mesas, becoming one of two national
representatives for victims of sexual and gendered violence on the national Mesa.
She has held these seats for over two terms. Yanela has taken this as a platform to
advocate for the needs of her community while communicating to the nation and
the international community the forms of violence that she and her community
face. The threats against her life continue for her outspoken advocacy but she
states, “I can’t keep quiet, because at this point if I do, I become an accomplice to
the violence”.
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It was this work, her hard-earned expertise in the armed conflict and in
victims’ organizing, that had led us to the interview, and eventually, to my
questions about participation in transitional justice. Given her constant organizing
and her position on mesas at three levels of government, her understanding of
transitional justice and of victims’ participation is broad and grounded in lived
experience.
Critiques of Participation by Representatives to the Mesas
Yanela’s narrative rests, as so many other personal stories in Colombia do,
between the particular and the general. It tells her story, or at least a very brief
version of it. It also tells the story of her family, of her community, and of many in
her region affected by FARC presence and violence in the 1990s. Yet, if we blur
the details, the armed group involved or the region, the story becomes a much
broader one.66 It is a story of sexual violence, endemic in this armed conflict. It is
a story of forced displacement, shared with almost 8 million other Colombians,
according to official figures.67 It is also a story of a victimized-survivor finding
support through the efforts of victims’ organizing and finding personal meaning in
participating in the work of transitional justice.
The Unidad de Victimas has registered 8,944,137 individual victims of the armed conflict (Unidad de
Victimas, 2020). The true figure of the number of people subject to a human rights violation is much
higher, given the widespread hesitancy and inability of victimized-survivors to register. Though Yanela
was subject to violence at the hands of the FARC, a guerrilla group, it is important to reiterate that the
vast majority of the gravest violations of human rights occurred at the hands of paramilitary forces
(Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2018).
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The U.N. Refugee Agency under the Human Rights Council, placed the total number of internally
displaced persons in Colombia at 7,671,124 in 2018, the last year figures were published. (UNHCR 2018)
This doesn’t include Colombians who have left the country as refugees, asylees, or other emigrants.
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In the course of my research, I interviewed five different representatives
serving on municipal, departmental, and national mesas across Antioquia. Among
these five were a member of the Transitional Justice Committee for Medellín’s
Mesa, the president of Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa, and a representative to the
National Mesa serving on the Gender and Sexual Violence Committee. The
resonances among their stories were astounding. They were all forcibly displaced
persons, fleeing violence from more rural parts of the country. They were all
incredibly dedicated to their work organizing victimized-survivors, despite the
significant personal and financial burdens incurred from their work. Perhaps most
relevant to this dissertation, they shared similar critiques of work of the mesas,
and the limits to effective participation. I also interviewed two directors of the
Victims’ Unit in Medellín, who echoed the concerns of the representatives.68
The critiques they offered of the work of the mesas, echoed that of those
organizing and working with the Peace Councils. Many named spotty
participation by state officials in convening or attending meetings, or inadequate
coordination. “Officials often miss important meetings, and when they do come,
they fail to invite us representatives. Other times, they call me with less than a
few hours notice to show up to a meeting across town or even in another city”
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). They also echoed
the experiences of representatives from the workshop in Cauca, stating that there

This does not include many other informal conversations with representatives to mesas, including my
participation in the First Departmental Meeting of Representatives in Cauca.
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is support for public facing work but institutions never have resources available
for reparations or development projects. “We can educate our people about their
rights, run campaigns, hold workshops, hand out flyers, but how do we look when
nothing happens and we can only share our frustrations”(Medellín’s Municipal
Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). They discussed the complexities of
navigating a fractured state often at odds with its own goals. “We would work
together for months with the Ombudsman’s Office and the Victims’ Unit, making
plans for the security of our community, but then after months of ignoring us, a
general shows up and tells us our plans are inoperable. End of story” (Medellín’s
Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). These limitations to
participation are essential to grasp the ambivalence of the state’s approach to
transitional justice. They represent the real limits of political will across state
institutions and are alone enough to collapse efforts for transitional justice.
Yet, compounding these bureaucratic limitations are personal ones,
themselves structural and widespread. Nearly all of the representatives I
interviewed named personal challenges in their work. They made clear the links
between their personal circumstances and the broader politics of war, peace, and
transitional justice. “They are killing us with the issue of our subsistence. You
have to understand that the great majority of us are women, and almost all of us
are the heads of our households. This is my job 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. My
phone never stops. Yet for all this, I get paid 82,000 pesos a month. How are we
supposed to feed our families?” (Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative,
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April 10, 2018).69 The issue of basic livelihood was prominent amongst all of the
representatives I interviewed. Many were in a position of financial precarity
before their forced displacement, others, despite some resources, have struggled
since leaving their families and places of birth. Regardless, they were unified in
stating that the meager stipend afforded to them by the mesas was inadequate in
supporting themselves and their families.
The work itself presents a burden in terms of time and cost as active
representatives become key figures in civil society connecting state institutions,
non-profit organizations, and victims’ groups across Medellín and Antioquia.
“Being on the mesa means staying connected with civil society groups and
institutions. I travel daily across the city and often to the territories.70 The stipend
doesn’t even cover my transportation costs.”71 “This year, seven representatives
left the mesa [before the end of their term] because of their economic situation”
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). “We have a very
powerful mesa. This is a way they keep us in our place.(Medellín’s Municipal
Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018).
Others named a struggle with officials who dumped work on them but
refused to offer support, for example, dropping off hundreds of pages of drafted
69 Approximately
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Territories, in Colombia, refers to rural areas, often implying Afro-Colombian and Indigenous
communities. The use of the term territory suggests a particular politics of cultural and political
autonomy.
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Representative to Medellín’s Municipal Mesa.
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transitional justice policy and telling them to offer detailed commentary and
community response in a limited time frame. “Hardly any leaders in these
processes have a higher education, high school at best. The Victims’ Unit
sometimes say they will support our studies, but the money never materializes.
How are we supposed to work to support our families, study, and be leaders at the
same time? Impossible” (Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7,
2018). “I was a school teacher, but from a very rural area. I had never studied law,
now I go to university, work, and do my work on the Mesa. I don’t know how I
manage but if I wasn’t studying law, I couldn’t be an effective representative”
(Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7, 2018).
Lastly, many named the psychological burden they carry. “This work gives
us direction and focuses our energy, but we still don’t have the kinds of
physiological support we need for what we lived through” (Antioquia’s
Departmental Mesa Representative, April 7, 2018). “Sometimes I wake up in the
middle of the night, drenched in sweat, other times I don’t sleep at all. The
pressure of it all feels like too much sometimes, and the threats don’t stop”
(Medellín’s Municipal Mesa Representative, April 10, 2018). Here too the state
fails to create the conditions necessary for a permanent and effective participation
by victimized-survivors.
The Brazilian anthropologist, Silvia Monroy Álvarez (2013), in her study
of violence and community responses in Urabá, names a generalized state of
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“permanent present” (p. 7).72 She says that her study “is about violence and some
of its effects, that are also its causes” that is the “propensity, tendency, inclination,
or predisposition to live life in its actuality” (p. 7). This orientation, both temporal
and cosmological, she claims, is product of the struggle for survival, and
reproduces the need for short term solutions to dire problems. “They [the
community members she worked with] do not return to a historic past, nor an
anticipated future, organized and directed, rather they are focused on the
possibilities and hopelessness of the present” (p. 7). This state of distress and
precarity, made quotidian, is both a result of and reason for the conflict. People,
under these conditions, struggle to imagine and work for collective change
become mired in violence, often contributing to its reproduction in the daily
compromises that survival requires.
Against a larger state narrative of transition, the optimism of change and
more peaceful futures against a violent and turbulent past, many of my
interviewees’ reflections both refute and echo Álvarez’s understanding. Caught in
the ambivalence of their experience, they name the necessity of hope, of the
possibilities for social transformation that they work for. Indeed, many offer
testimony to the improvements they have already contributed to and witnessed.
“The Accords have made a difference. Violence is not what it used to be, I can
now cross the river and visit my grandchildren, I can now farm my family’s land.

She names her study an anthropography, rather than an ethnography, seeking to focus and name the
particular and refute any attempt to render universal any of her observations .
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Things are getting better here and that helps to continue working” (Brisas
Community President, March 26, 2018). Yet the pressures of organizing and
participating in peace processes are relentless. Representatives and leaders all
name the multiple pressures they endure: their efforts for connection with a larger
society that at times suspects them for their participation, questioning their
possible allegiances to armed groups or their self-interest; the burden of past and
ongoing traumas that haunt their everyday; the quotidian struggles of economic
precarity, racism, and sexism; and the never ending threats against their lives and
the unknowability of the origin or seriousness of those threats. In each of these
cases, the state has a responsibility. To ensure effective and ongoing participation
of victimized-survivors in transitional justice, the state must support their work
materially and discursively. It must be unified in ending decades-long counterinsurgency tactics and discourses that cast suspicion on those organizing for peace
and justice. It must provide for the education, mental and physical health of
participants, and daily subsistence of those participating in transitional justice.
Most minimally, it must secure the basic right to non-repetition, the right to
participate in politics and governance, the right to name past harm without that
work making one a target for future violence. These responsibilities are basic and
necessary, without meeting them, not only is the work of transitional justice
compromised, but participants are condemned to the conditions of a permanent
present.
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Conclusion
In the last two chapters I have outlined two important mechanisms for
community and victims’ participation in transitional justice including their legal
and bureaucratic frameworks, Peace Councils and the mesas. Through weaving in
the experiences and perspectives of my interviewees, many who occupy multiple
positions as scholars, advocates, and researchers, as well as victimized-survivors
and participants of transitional justice, I have offered a genealogical and grounded
critique of these mechanisms focused on their effects of local and marginalized
communities.73 Analysis of political economy, the logic of counter-insurgency,
and the fabric of Colombian governmentally, have been woven in as necessary to
give context and explicate the critiques of my interviewees.
The next chapter, my conclusion, may seem to introduce new substantive
social facts: the current landscape of violence, state responses, the state of the
peace accord. Yet, my intention, in addition to giving context to the actuality of
participation in Colombian transitional justice, is that these social facts are
themselves an intervention in overly optimistic or teleological approaches to
human rights. They, like much of the facts I present in this work, are abrupt. They
represent a contradiction to and a departure from the linear narratives of progress
reproduced by the state. They serve as an interruption to legalist understandings of

It is genealogical in that it draws from a combination of local knowledge and critical scholarship. It is
grounded in that these knowledges are drawn from the past and ongoing experiences of those living under
a country at war, victimized-survivors, advocates, organizers, researches, and social leaders. Each of the
persons I talked to during my time in Colombia occupied several of these positions.
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transitional justice that focus on the structure of law and longstanding debates that
tend to animate the discourse. They make plain that what is at stake is not simply
the success of a legal and bureaucratic instrument of governance and human
rights, but the lives of people and the fabric of society. This is what is at stake.
This is what demands our attention and must animate our understanding and
solidarity.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion

“The victim who is able to articulate the situation of the victim has ceased to be a
victim: he or she has become a threat.” (Baldwin, 2011, p. 134)
“Nos están matando.”74
While in the previous section I have outlined some of the institutional,
bureaucratic, and structural limits to meaningful and transformative participation,
I have only made passing mention to the true catastrophe of the Peace Process: the
widespread systematic murder of social leaders and human rights defenders. Over
a hundred social leaders and human rights defenders have been murdered each
year for their political participation since the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016.
The official tally varies by institution depending on methodology. The United
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia places
the figure at over 400 since the signing of the Peace Accord in 2016, though they
acknowledge their limited ability to track and confirm cases and note a particular
slowdown in their counting in 2020 due to the COVID 19 pandemic (Human
Rights Watch, 2021).75 Colombia’s Ombudsman’s office lists 712 documented
killings while Somos Defensores and Indepaz, Colombian human rights
“They are killing us.” Both a quote from an interview with a representative to a mesa, and a widespread
rallying call amongst social leaders.
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The pandemic has been devastating to the already overburdened Colombian healthcare system,
resulting in widespread infection and death. The quarantine, mandated nationally, is understood as having
contributed to the increased assassination of human rights defenders and social leaders through the
restriction of their movement. This restriction facilitated their targeting by armed groups who either
evaded or were ignored by state forces policing the quarantine.
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organizations tracking the murders, have documented 600 and 971 cases
respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Indepaz, 2020).76 While the total
number of deaths in Colombia related to the armed conflict has decreased
significantly since the signing of the Peace Accord and the demobilization of the
FARC, the numbers of targeted assassinations of social leaders and human rights
defenders has steadily grown.
Despite statements made by some officials in the Duque administration
asserting that these killings are unrelated to political participation, each of the
organizations above have, through their own research, confirmed that the
murdered person was a social leader or human rights defender and was targeted
for their work.77 The OHCHR provided Human Rights Watch with a
categorization of leaders murdered since 2016. The main categories included trade
unionists, campesino leaders, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous leaders (who were
disproportionately represented among those targeted).78 The report does not
address overlapping categories but makes clear that by far the greatest number of
leaders assassinated were defenders of human rights actively involved in

The first three figures were compiled in an early 2021 report from Human Rights Watch in which they
communicated directly with this organization: OHCHR. (https://www.ohchr.org/en/countries/lacregion/
pages/coindex.aspx), Defensoria del Pueblo (https://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/), Somos Defensores
(https://somosdefensores.org). Indepaz, The Institute for the Study of Development and Peace, maintains
a daily register of murders reported by civil society organizations. The comprehensiveness of this method
explains their higher number and points to the even greater number of killings that go unreported.
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See below for elaboration of these statements and other state responses.

“According to OHCHR, approximately 16 percent of all the human rights defenders killed since 2016
were Indigenous leaders. Only 4.4 percent of Colombia’s population is estimated to be Indigenous.”
(Human Rights Watch, 2021, p. 25).
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Colombian participatory organizations. The largest single group, with 130 cases
of the 412 documented by the OHCHR), was members of Neighborhood Action
Committees, another state legislated and coordinated mechanism of social
organization and political participation that functions across the country towards
the “defense of human rights” (Human Rights Watch, 2021; Somos Defensores,
2019).79 While this Human Rights Watch report using OHCHR data only
documents 10 cases of “Victims’ Rights Activists,” interviews with leaders, as
well as other reports, evidence the systematic targeting and killing of these
activists. Indeed, given that positions on Victims’ Mesas are elected to specific
terms of service and often overlap with other leadership roles, there is a lack of
information and general undercounting of the murder of these representatives.80
Yet, by all accounts, those involved in transitional justice in general, and in the
implementation of the Peace Accord in particular, have paid heavily for their
activism. Over half of the murders occurred in areas with Territorial Development
Programs, initiatives created by the government addressing the requirements of
Rural Reform and Reparation in the Peace Accords (Human Rights Watch, 2020,

The Neighborhood Action Committees (Juntas de Action Comunal) have a long international history
originating in the anti-colonial struggles of the mid twentieth century. They emerged in Colombia in the
ashes of La Violencia to address the lack of state presence and effective governance in rural areas
following the civil war. They were first supported by the Colombian state in 1958 with Law 19, and have
more recently been revived and re-invested in through Law 743 of 2002 and Decree 2350 of 2003(Somos
Defensores, 2019). Many of my interviewees have also served on these committees.
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Many prominent cases though have been documented. To give just two examples, I note the murders of
Jonny Castro, who served on a municipal Victim’s Mesa in the department of Nariño, and of Jorge Solano
of the municipal Victim’s Mesa of Ocaña en North Santander, both killed in November of 2020 (Radio
Nacional, 2020) (Unidad de Victimas, 2020). Indeed, this chapter could easily be filled with the names of
past representatives of Mesas who were murdered for their work.
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p. 27).81 Municipalities with active or planned programs of coca substitution are
also disproportionately represented by cases of murdered leaders. In general, rural
areas, particularly those with the presence of armed groups and with active illegal
economies account for the great majority of assassinations (Human Rights Watch,
2020; Indepaz, 2021; Somos Defensores, 2020). Also over represented are areas
that were formally occupied by FARC guerrilla forces that have since
demobilized.
All of this is to say, that it is precisely those areas most of concern to
transitional justice programs, those upon which the success of these efforts
depends on leadership from and collaboration with local communities, that are
seeing the greatest number of targeted killings with the intention to silence
dissent, suppress organizing, and minimize political participation. The deaths, of
course, represent only a fraction of violent acts conducted by armed groups meant
to scare civil society into compliance, and these acts are increasing in scale. In
2020 alone, the Ombudsman office registered 972 violent acts against social
leaders and human rights defenders of which 182 were assassinations, another 51
were attempted assassinations and 607 were serious threats. Other acts included
kidnapping, arbitrary detention, forced displacement, and other unnamed acts
(González Gaitán, 2020).
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State Response
In contrast to killings in decades past, this most recent surge in the murder
of Colombian leaders has not been ignored by the national and international press,
foreign states, or international human rights organizations or NGOs. Indeed, the
ever-growing array of transitional justice frameworks and the push towards
diplomatic ends of the civil war, have come in large part from the efforts of
Colombian social movements and international pressure. Yet, much like the
structures of participation available to the Colombian citizenry and the transitional
justice programs in place, the state’s response to the systematic murder of leaders
has been both overly complex, fragmented, and ultimately ineffectual.
The 2021 Human Rights Watch report, entitled “Left Undefended,”
outlined fifteen different mechanisms and committees created by the government
to address the murders and protect leaders, the majority of which were created
under the Duque administration. They conclude that these programs have been
ineffectual for a variety of reasons, including inadequate implementation, lack of
funding, tepid official participation, or untimely programming and responses.
Often the announced programs are far reaching and broad in scope only to be
severely limited geographically or in actual planning and implementation. The
large number of programs create confusion, a duplication of efforts, and
contribute to poor coordination between agencies, who are often unaware of each
other’s work.
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There are transitional justice committees, security committees, prevention
subcommittees, sessions of the Inter-Agency Commission for Rapid
Response to Early Warnings, meetings of the Program of Early Action....
We talk a lot but implement little,” an official from the Human Rights
Ombudsperson’s Office told Human Rights Watch. (Human Rights Watch,
2021, p. 68)
Social leaders are left to figure out what mechanism or committee might
best serve their needs, often in moments of great distress following threats,
assassination attempts, and acts of forced displacement. Local communities often
lack trust in these mechanisms and not only due to their obtuse complexity and
ineffectiveness. The Duque administration, in particular, has contributed to this
suspicion by failing to call to order committees or hold scheduled meetings
regarding mechanisms to address the murders. They have appointed officials who
are seen as oppositional to the peace process and are unreliable in their posts. For
example, in 2019, Duque appointed General Leonardo Barrero as director of the
Timely Action Plan for Prevention and the Protection of Human Rights
Defenders, Community and Social Leaders and Journalists (PAO) despite his
publicly acknowledged involvement in covering up extrajudicial executions
committed by the military and then seeking to interfere with ongoing
investigations (Human Rights Watch, 2021).
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Also egregious has been the continual denial of the murders. The Minister
of Defense, Guillermo Botero, from 2018 to 2019, stated that in regards to social
protest, “detrás de eso siempre hay mafias organizadas. ¡Pero mafias de verdad,
mafias supranacionales!” (Verdad Abierta, 2018, para. 1).82 His predecessor, Luis
Carlos Villegas, also appointed by President Duque, stated, to national and
international infamy, that “La inmensa mayoría de muertes de líderes sociales se
deben a peleas de vecinos, faldas y por rentas ilícitas” (Verdad Abierta, 2018,
para. 2).83 While these statements in no way represent the entirety of the
Colombian state, they do represent a particular approach to political dissent and
social movements that has long been held by sectors of the government and
business elite: that all resistance to their interests represents a form of
unacceptable subversion, an internal enemy.84 This concept serves to mark,
stigmatize, and judge any Colombian. The communist, the leftist, the social
leader, the defender of human rights, the labor organizer, the student, he who has
nothing to lose because of their condition of poverty, is labeled an internal enemy
and an enemy must be pursued and eliminated (Torres Vásquez, et al., 2020).85
The parallels in the dysfunction of mechanisms of protection for social
leaders and human rights defenders with those for political participation,
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Behind all that there are always organized mafias. Real mafias, international mafias!

The vast majority of the deaths of social leaders are due to fights between neighbors, due to sexual
jealousy and illegal activities.
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Indeed, they were denounced by other state official and institutions at the time.
My translation.
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particularly concerning victims’ mesas and peace processes, are not simply
notable. In essence, they are the same failures occurring in the implementation of
transitional justice. Rural reform, land restitution, reparation, processes of truth
and justice all rely on robust and safe participation by those left most vulnerable
by the armed conflict. Victimized survivors must be able to name their
experiences, gather and organize with others, and claim what is due to them
through effective participation as outlined in the Peace Accord. The complex,
fractured and ambivalent stance of the state, in regards to the protection of social
leaders and defenders of human rights are a part of a larger failure in the
implementation of transitional justice.
The Political Economy of War and Peace
This new genocide of social leaders has another recent historical analog in
Colombia’s history of violence - the targeted assassination of members of Union
Patriotica (UP) in the 1990s (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018; Karl,
2019). The UP was a political party formed a decade earlier through three
ultimately failed peace processes involving the FARC. Despite the collapse of
these efforts to negotiate a lasting peace, the UP emerged as an “alternative path,”
offering Colombians a viable third party in opposition to the traditional Liberal
and Conservative parties dominated respectively by urban and rural elites (Centro
Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2018). This non-violent political party won
unprecedented victories for the Colombian left but its movement was eroded and
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ultimately ended through the murder of over four thousand of its members by the
Armed Forced of Colombia and allied paramilitary groups (Centro Nacional de
Memoria Histórica, 2018). This systematic killing served to escalate the civil war,
driving many former guerrilla soldiers back into the armed conflict. At stake, for
political elites and capitalist forces, was the balance of power in Colombia. In the
face of mass social mobilization and an emergent non-violent political force,
violence was dispersed from key sites of conflict between armed groups, coming
to inhabit an ever-increasing portion of the Colombian landscape.
The paramilitary forces behind many of the murders of the UP found
financial and political support, including through legal avenues, in the 1990s.
With the official and unofficial support of the state, they extended their actions in
a territorial struggle for control of land. Deals were made with narco-trafficking
cartels to secure land for coca production. National and multinational agricultural
corporations supported their war on local communities in a scarcely hidden bid to
expand their own territorial holdings. Various forms of mining including gold and
coal, as well as petroleum and coal extraction depended on the terrorization of
campesino, Indigenous, and Afro-Colombian communities to gain access to
remote areas. Even large multi-national development projects building mega dams
and commercial ports exercised their interests through paramilitary violence. In
the last and first decade of the twentieth century, their mass and brutal campaign
of violence, dwarfed the numbers of human rights violations attributed to other
armed groups including the Armed Forces of Colombia and the various guerrilla
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organizations. Through massacres, rape, torture, dismemberment, forced
disappearance, and targeted assassination, paramilitary violence drove mass
displacement, making Colombia the country with the greatest number of
internally displaced people. This violence existed alongside and in response to a
history of social mobilization and legal reform that created ever greater
opportunities for claims to land and resources.
The Uribe-backed demobilization of the AUC, the largest
paramilitary umbrella organization, introduced new frameworks for transitional
justice, including the introduction of the legal category for victims and entitlement
to specific rights. Yet, it did little to stem paramilitary violence, instead fracturing
their organization and providing new opportunities for mergers and collaborations
with narco-trafficking cartels. It was not until the signing of the Peace Accord
with the FARC in 2016, followed by the agreed to demobilization of the great
majority of active guerrilla soldiers, that Colombia has had a significant lull in the
number of massacres, newly forcibly displaced persons, and total number of
deaths due to the armed conflict. Since the signing of the Peace Accord, mass
displacement has lost priority as the main strategy of economic development.
National and international attention was instead on transitional justice in
Colombia. Claims to land restitution by victims of forced displacement and
petitions for the granting of communal territories of Afro-Colombian and
Indigenous communities increased. New numbers of victimized survivors of the
armed conflict came out of the shadows to register themselves as victims, claim
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restitution and reparation, participate in promised development projects, and seek
justice. Their bravery, encouraged by promises of safety, rights, and
transformation by the state, has been met with a new wave of violence. The
systematic killing of human rights defenders and social leaders outlined above
threatens to unravel the gains made by the Peace Process, plunging the country
back into unrestrained violence. In 2020, the UN documented 66 massacres in
Colombia, resulting in the deaths of 255 persons (UN News, 2020). Urabá, Bajo
Cauca, el Chocó, among other regions have seen armed conflict between the
military, paramilitary, guerrilla, and narco-cartels resume, to the terror of local
communities. “Colombia has never had a state of post-conflict, we can only talk
about a state of post-accord” (Antioquia’s Departmental Mesa Representative,
April 7, 2018). And yet, the state of the Accord and its implementation, some four
and a half years later, is still not guaranteed.
State of the Peace Accord
The Kroc Institute released an official report in August of 2020
documenting the state of the implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord. It offers a
point-by-point analysis, revealing the failures of the Colombian state to secure
peace and pursue meaningful transitional justice. Below I summarize the findings
of the report relevant to this dissertation beginning with Point 1 on Rural Reform.
Four years in, about half of the PDET (Territorial Development Plans) and
PATR (Action Plans for Regional Development) have been written, though no
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meaningful progress has been made towards their implementation (Kroc, 2020).
The Peace Accord also provided a framework for the distribution of over 12
million hectares in 12 years to landless farmers as well as Indigenous and AfroColombian communities. While 30% of this land has been secured in a land trust,
no land has yet to be granted (Kroc, 2020). This not only represents a lack of
concrete progress towards rural reform, but must be considered against the fact
that 98% of murders of social leaders have occurred in municipalities marked for
such efforts (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Areas marked for programs for the
substitution of illegal crops under Point 4 for the Peace Accord also contain a
disproportionate number of social leaders murdered. The Kroc Institute (2020)
report documents that only 6% of these programs have been implemented.
In regards to Point 2 on Political Participation, a key part of the Accord,
and the main focus of this dissertation, the Kroc Institute found that the
government had initiated less than half of the programs stipulated in the accord.
Of these, no major legislation required to implement participation has passed in
the Colombian congress. These failed projects included the Special Transitory
Peace Voting Districts, which would have created 16 special seats in the House of
Representatives for representatives of victims’ organizations (Kroc, 2020). The
report also notes the failure of the state to provide adequate technical or financial
support for the proper functioning of national and territorial peace councils (Kroc,
2020).
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Without doubt, the most successful part of the Peace Accord, occurred
under point 3, addressing the “end of the conflict.” The UNHCR recognized the
demobilization of 13,202 FARC combatants by 2019 of which 12,940 participated
in state reincorporation programs (Kroc, 2020). These persons represent the vast
majority of FARC forces, effectively ending the existence of a national FARC
guerrilla force. Yet the promises made to these ex-combatants have yet to be
fulfilled with just under half of programs for land access and development
projects directed towards their well-being having been completed. More
worrisome, and in line with the larger issues outlined in this dissertation, safety
for their participation has not been secured. Since the time of their demobilization
to the end of 2020, 244 ex-FARC combatants have been murdered according to
the UN verification mission (UN News, 2020).
Point 5, concerning the Victims of the armed conflict, has seen mixed
results. This includes the creation of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice,
Reparation and Non-Recurrence (SIVJRNR) and of 22 Casas de la Verdad across
the country offering education on human rights and taking testimony of victims of
the armed conflict (Kroc, 2020). Cases prosecuting perpetrators of human rights
violations are ongoing, though without the investigation or prosecution of third
party intellectual authors of the acts. This makes the addressing of the underlying
causes of the human rights violations impossible, and does nothing to transform
the conditions that perpetrate violence today. Notably, no programs related to the
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guarantee of non-repetition under this Point have been completed, and those that
have commenced are deemed minimal (Kroc, 2020).
Questions of Ambivalence
This report, of course, only confirms what leaders, including those I’ve
interviewed, have been saying about the failures of the implementation of the
accord. They say that much has been proposed, though little has been done. Those
efforts are often confusing and contradictory. That they are holding up their end of
the deal, to talk to their community, to organize, to document, to propose, and to
plan. They give testimony, not only to the crime to which they were subjected, but
to the conditions of their lives that create the context for the armed conflict.
Almost always this comes at great risk and cost. They sometimes become marked
as troublemakers, as leftists, as guerrilla sympathizers or collaborators. They
come under the watch of armed groups, tracked for their activities and the threat it
represents to their interests. Often, the outcome is worse, another headline,
another statistic; more meaningfully, another absence in the community, another
family member missing, grieved. And yet, for others, another reason to step up, to
speak out, to organize, and to participate.
The state, on the other hand, risks little and gains much. Talks are initiated,
committees are formed, plans are sometimes drafted, but the real work of
financing and implementing community development programs has yet to begin.
At the state’s behest, coca farmers have enrolled in programs for the substitution
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of their crops, but rather than receiving the technical and material support needed
to transition their farms, they are subject to ongoing state fumigations and left to
defend themselves against the violence of cartels.86 Victims’ rights leaders are
made to gather for workshops, trainings, and photo ops. Through this participation
they become another kind of number, a tally of projects initiated, efforts
underway, proof of the good use of international funding and of the good will of
the Colombian state.
These processes, of course, are necessary for participatory transitional
justice. For TJ to strive to be bottom up, to incorporate the voices of victims, to
take seriously the realities on the ground, vulnerable people must participate.
They witness, they organize, they document, they plan, and they work. Of course,
this labor has always been present and does not depend on the state, or on
international bodies, or on law. Indeed, social movements in Colombia not only
preceded the creation of transitional justice frameworks, they called them into
being and gave them shape through mass mobilization, protest, and political
pressure.
Through participation, the Colombian state and its most powerful
stakeholders have found a way to channel civil society energy into a Kafkaesque
maze of bureaucratic procedure. Commissions are made, at times convened and at
other times not. Methodology is drafted. Timelines are set, then extended, only to
Yet another example of how, time and time again, a state institution beings work in good faith only to
have their actions undermined and contradicted by another.
86
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be extended again or indeterminately postponed. Officials join and civil society
groups are asked to participate. Or sometimes not. In particularly successful
commissions, plans are drafted and circulated but then rarely implemented.
Implementation itself, when initiated, is partial, scattered, underfunded and
insufficient. This is the story of participation in Colombian governance. Since the
beginning of the implementation of national transitional justice programs such as
the Peace and Justice, the 2011 Victims’ law, and the 2016 Peace Accords, it may
be said that this story is being echoed, channeling energy, effort, and resources
into bureaucracy that allows for long lists of efforts underway and actions taken
but does little to change either the conditions of violence that permeate the
everyday or the political economy that underlies this violence.
Through the last few chapters, I have attempted to not only present a sense
of what participation in transitional justice in Colombia looks like, how it is
structured, and how it is experienced by some community and victims’
representatives, but to highlight a thread of internal conflict I am naming
ambivalence. These simultaneous and contradictory experiences, structures,
bureaucracies, positions, and goals in relation to transitional justice run through
state institutions, officials, civil society, social movements, and participants
themselves. Indeed, how does one understand rule of law in the context of a
conflicted democracy, let alone in the context of efforts towards transitional
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justice through an ongoing conflict?87 While the application of law is always
uneven, more so in countries with high levels of social inequality and social
division, Colombia is remarkable in the gap between the letter of human rights
and transitional justice law and its application. Political participation by civil
society, and most importantly, by victimized-survivors, has helped propel the
creation of a dense tapestry of legal structures for truth, justice, and social
transformation. Yet, the interests of national and international capital and political
elites, funneled through majoritarian discourse, produce the conditions for the
vitiation of these legal frameworks, and an ongoing state of violence and
exploitation.
Critical scholarship has addressed these tensions within the larger field of
human rights, naming fundamental ambivalences in the formulation of rights
based discourse and its application. When Rancière asks, “Who is the subject of
human rights?”, concluding that it cannot be an essential universal figure such as
“Man” or “Citizen,” but rather that these are political categories that are contested
and under continual recreation, I am drawn to reflect on a more particular
question: Who is the victim as subject of rights in Colombian transitional justice?
(Golder, 2015, p. 90). Indeed, individuals, scholars, social movements, and now
Colombian law, has redefined this subject countless times, with consequential
effects in terms of organizing, politics, policy, and jurisprudence. The subject of

If rule of law assumes the equal application of law across the body politic, then the notion of a
conflicted democracy itself acknowledges the failure to meet this standard.
87
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rights, a victim of the Colombian civil war, or otherwise, is inherently in an
ambivalent position. To seek to ground the category in a concept of humanity, or
conversely through a reductive binary of perpetrator and victim, is inherently and
unavoidably exclusionary. As we ask, What is left behind in the defining of the
human, historically, and in our present?, so must we ask, What is at stake in our
conception of the victim, and who does it leave out? Conversely, we must see the
potential of the mutability of these categories. Who may emerge as a subject to
claim rights? How can such an emergence fundamentally alter rights discourse,
and the structures through which claims are made and addressed?
Additionally, we must, as scholars of transitional justice, take seriously the
Foucauldian questions of subject formation. In claiming rights as victims, how are
the subjects of participation produced? What logics, particularly those of counterinsurgency and capitalism, inform this production? Who once again is left out?
What effect does participation, made available to such subjects, have on the larger
politics of, for example, social movements? These questions in turn must also be
asked of the state and its strategies of governance. If the state sees peace and
development though essentially capitalist, extractivist, and neoliberal forms, what
forms of participation are left to those critical of how these very values produce
and reproduce armed conflict and mass violence?
The research presented in this dissertation does not answer these
questions, though they have informed my inquiry. Instead, my hope is that by
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offering a perspective on the structures of participation in transitional justice in
Colombia, and focusing on the experiences of victimized-survivors of the armed
conflict and victim’s representatives in such participation, I have contributed to a
conversation with others willing to address difficult questions. By focusing on the
ambivalent nature of transitional justice, in the history of Colombia and past
accords, in the posture and efforts of the state, and most importantly by listening
to the perspectives and experiences of participants, I hope to belie both the
hopeful optimism that sees the work of peace and justice in Colombia as complete
and the deterministic pessimism that nothing can ever change. On the contrary,
the state of violence and the work of peace and justice in Colombia is always in
flux, subject to the political pressures that we all collectively place on it. This is
our responsibility.
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Appendix A
Timeline
MARCH 2018
1st and 2nd weeks: First round of interviews with CEPO team members. Finalize
preparation for site visits.
3rd and 4th weeks: Site visits to the municipalities of Dabeiba, Remedios, Anorí,
Ituango y Vigía del fuerte.
APRIL 2018
1st and 2nd weeks: Second round of interviews with CEPO team members.
Support in compilation, transcription, and translation of CEPO’s interviews from
site visits.
3rd and 4th weeks: Conduct interviews with members of institutional bodies and
social movement leaders. Continue to support in compilation, transcription, and
translation of CEPO’s interviews from site visits.
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Appendix B
Sample Questions for Semi-Structured Interviews
Entrevista con miembros del CEPO
Interviews with CEPO team members
Fecha:_______________
No.__________________
Donde naciste? Donde fuiste criado?
Where you born? Where were you raised?
Que estas estudiando/ enseñando en la Universidad de Antioquia?
What are you studying/teaching at the Universidad de Antioquia?
Porque decidiste estudiar/ trabajar en esta disciplina?
Why did you decide to study/ work in this discipline?
Cuales son tus primeros recuerdos del conflicto armado en Colombia, tal vez tus primeros
tres recuerdos?
What are your first memories of the armed conflict in Colombia, perhaps your first three
memories?
Cual fue la primera vez que oíste tus padres hablar del conflicto?
When did you first hear your parents talk about the conflict?
De lo que has estudiado y de lo que recuerdas, que es el conflicto armado?
From what you have studies and from what you remember, what is this armed conflict?
Que piensas son algunas de las causas del conflicto?
What do you think are some of the causes of the conflict?
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz?
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord in general is progressing?
Quien son las victimas del conflicto armado?
Who are the victims of the armed conflict?
Cual es el papel de víctimas en el Acuerdo de Paz?
What is the role of victims in the Peace Accord?
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Cual es el papel del gobierno en e Acuerdo de Paz?
What is the role of the government in the Peace Accord?
Que deberes tiene el gobierno a las víctimas del conflicto armado?
What obligations dos the government have to victims of the the armed conflict?
Piensas que el Acuerdo cumple con normas nacionales y internacionales?
Do you think the Accord conforms to national and international norms?
Cual es el papel del CEPO en el proceso de paz?
What is CEPO’s role in the peace process?
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz en los municipios que vamos a
visitar?
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord is progressing in the
communities we are visiting?
Como están participando las victimas en la implementación del Acuerdo?
How are victims participating in the implementation of the Accord?
Que piensas que vas a ver en estas visitas? Como piensa que el Acuerdo de Paz ha
afectado la vida en estos municipios?
What do you think you will see on these visits? How do you think the Peace Accord has
affected life in these communities?
Como ves la situación de derechos humanos y seguridad en estos municipios?
How do you understand the state of human rights and security in these municipalities?
Que piensas que vas a aprender en estas visitas?
What do you think you will learn on these visits?
Hay algunas preguntas que tu crees son esenciales para las entrevistas que vas hacer in
estas visitas?
Are there any questions that you think are essential for the interviews you will conduct on
these visits?
Que entiendes del concepto de Justicia Transicional?
What do you understand by Transitional Justice?
Este concepto aplica a el Acuerdo de Paz? Aplica a otras leyes de Colombia? Sirve de
alguna forma para enfrentar los problemas que ha dejado el conflicto?
Does this concept apply to the Peace Accord? Does it apply to other Colombian laws? Is
it in some way useful to address the problems that the conflict has produced?
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Entrevista con Instituciones
Interviews with Institutions
Fecha:_______________
No._________________
Cual es tu posición en esta institución?
What is your position within this institution?
De que se trata tu trabajo? Cual son tus tareas cotidianas?
What does your work involve? What are some of your daily tasks?
Porque decidiste tomar esta posición? De hacer este trabajo?
Why did you decide to take this position? To do this work?
Cuales son tus primeros recuerdos de el conflicto armado en Colombia, tal vez tus
primeros tres recuerdos?
What are your first memories of the armed conflict in Colombia, perhaps your first three
memories?
De lo que has estudiado y de lo que recuerdas, que es el conflicto armado?
From what you have studied and from what you remember, what is this armed conflict?
Que piensas son algunas de las causas del conflicto?
What do you think are some of the causes of the conflict?
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz?
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord in general is progressing?
Cual es el papel de esta institución en la implementación de el Acuerdo de Paz?
What is the role of this institution in the implementation of the Peace Accord?
De que se trata el monitoreo y verificación de la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz?
What is involved in monitoring and verifying of the implementation of the Peace Accord?
Quienes son las víctimas del conflicto armado?
Who are the victims of the armed conflict?
Cual es el papel de víctimas en el Acuerdo de Paz?
What is the role of victims in the Peace Accord?
Como están participando las victims en la implementación del Acuerdo?
How are victims participating in the implementation of the Accord?
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Cual es el papel del gobierno en e Acuerdo de Paz?
What is the role of the government in the Peace Accord?
Que obligaciones tiene el gobierno a las víctimas del conflicto armado?
What obligations dos the government have to victims of the the armed conflict?
Como crees que esta avanzando el Acuerdo de Paz en los municipios mas afectados por
el conflicto?
How do you think the implementation of the Peace Accord is progressing in the
communities most affected by the conflict?
Como ves la situación de derechos humanos y seguridad en estos municipios?
How do you understand the state of human rights and security in these municipalities?
Que representa la implementación exitosa del Acuerdo de Paz? Como afectaría a la vida
en las comunidades afectadas por el conflicto armado?
What does the successful implementation of the Peace Accord represent? What would this
look like in communities affected by the armed conflict?
Que entiendes del concepto de Justicia Transicional?
What do you understand by Transitional Justice?
Este concepto aplica a el Acuerdo de Paz? Aplica a otras leyes de Colombia? Sirve de
alguna forma para enfrentar los problemas que ha dejado el conflicto?
Does this concept apply to the Peace Accord? Does it apply to other Colombian laws? Is
it in some way useful to address the problems that the conflict has produced?
Piensas que el Acuerdo cumple con normas nacionales y internacionales?
Do you think the Accord conforms to national and international norms?

